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ARTICLE 
 
The Right to Know and the Duty to Disclose:  
Pathways to Effective Monitoring, Reporting, 
and Verification within the Constitutionalism 
of Climate Justice  
 
TERESA THORP* 
Amartya Sen once wrote: “In fact, the real ‘bite’ of a theory of 
justice can, to a great extent, be understood from its 
informational base: what information is—or is not—taken to be 
directly relevant.”1  The relevancy of substantive guarantees may 
be the poignant element of an objective threshold of justice, but 
accountability, integrity, and temporality, discipline a subjective 
threshold.  Development is freedom, but the “willingness and 
capacity” to discipline information for effective justice is the 
oxygen of that freedom.2 
In certain lex specialis regimes, the right to information, 
public participation, and access to justice, form three pillars that 
guarantee the objectivity of effective justice.  In the subjective or 
behavioral context of the right to information, the right to know 
and the duty to disclose are fundamental for mobilizing the legal 
 
* BCM and PG. Dip Com. (Econ.), (New Zealand); LLB (Hons.) and LPC 
(London); MBA (Duke); LLM/DEA International Law (Paris). Researcher 
Utrecht University. Director Insight International (international sustainable 
development advocates). Email: teresa.thorp@insight-int.org or t.m.thorp@uu.nl.  
This paper builds on InsightInt Working Paper No. 2010.10.03 of 2010, which 
derived a unified approach to the legal principles of international climate law, 
and Working Paper No. 2011.04.11 of 2011, which subsequently refined the 
model.  It incorporates an update of an analysis of options for emissions 
reporting submitted to the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs in 2011. 
 1. AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 57 (1999) (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted); see also AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, INEQUALITY 
REEXAMINED 73 (1995). 
 2. Calling of an International Conference on Freedom of Information, G.A. 
Res. 59(I), at 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/59(I) (Dec. 14, 1946) 
[hereinafter Calling of an Int’l Conf. on Freedom of Info.]. 
1
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principle of equity.  Similarly, in international climate law, there 
is not only a need to guarantee rights.  Fulfilling rights is also 
intrinsic to a unified legal theory of climate justice. 
Notwithstanding these hard fought freedoms, the right to 
information is not always effective in international law.  Custom 
may reinforce a maxim inherited from French civil law, “donner 
et retenir ne vaut.”  (There is no point in giving with one hand and 
taking away with the other).  If the legitimate donor of the right 
to information reserves the right to revoke the right at will, or 
even retains possession of the right without giving it any effect at 
all, then this renders the right virtually worthless in all but the 
rarest of occasions. 
These concerns impinge on “elements” of normative validity.  
Just because a norm is “well-formed” does not mean it is valid.  
Even if the norm is valid, it may not be “well-formed.”  A valid 
norm ought to conform to its specification.  To focus on the quality 
of the normative specification, which is a question of justice, this 
Article concerns two elements that are prerequisites to validate 
inter vivos equity but considers them within the context of the 
right to information.  First, rights and obligations must be 
legitimate.  This is an objective element.  It is a question of fact.  
Second, rights and obligations must be effective.  Rights and 
obligations must come into effect at least at some point in time. 
A question of effect entails a subjective element of fairness.  
The subjective test may incorporate a test of conduct or procedure 
but the test may not necessarily have to trigger in the present.  In 
terms of validating equity for future generations, the legal norm 
may come into effect in the future.  Consequently, it may not 
require a claim by an existing person with full capacity.  Future 
beneficiaries may also hold an equitable title due to an entrusted 
fiduciary duty that links present and future generations. 
Besides its objective context, an “effective” climate law ought 
to incorporate a subjective element of intra and inter-
generational fairness as well.  Care must therefore ensue in 
trying to delimit “procedural equity” from “substantive equity.”  
Giving effect to legal equity may not be purely procedural at all.  
It may also require the reconciliation of informational freedoms 
with proactive (anticipatory) and reactive (responsive) 
obligations.  This Article demonstrates what these issues may 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/4
  
142 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
mean in practice for states and non-state actors.  It engages with 
legal science and jurisprudence to compare and contrast some 
existing and some prospective climate disclosure obligations.  It 
also flags the transposition of state attribution to shared 
responsibility from the perspective of the right to know and the 
duty to disclose.  In drawing to a conclusion, the paper suggests 
that normative pathways that guarantee and fulfill the right to 
information as a normative derivative of legal equity may 
contribute to an evolving constitutionalism of the fundamental 
legal principles of international climate law. 
The Article is in two parts.  Part one sets the scene.  It 
examines the dynamic interactions between the right to 
information, human rights, and environmental law from an 
objective perspective.  It situates monitoring, reporting, and 
verification (MRV) within a new architecture of human rights as 
“people’s rights.”  Part two then delves into how international 
human rights and environmental law may inform a “subjective” 
test of equity by mobilizing the “right to information” in 
international climate law.  In doing so, it shows how a new 
approach to international legal architecture, one based on 
“people’s rights,” may help to improve the effectiveness of MRV in 
terms of multi-nodal and multi-level governance. 
I. THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AND THE RIGHT TO 
INFORMATION 
A. International Human Rights and the Right to 
 Information 
Already at its very first session in 1946, the United Nations 
(U.N.) General Assembly considered that, “freedom of information 
is a fundamental human right . . . [It is] the touchstone of all the 
freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.”3  The U.N. 
General Assembly observed further that the, “[f]reedom of 
information requires as an indispensable element the willingness 
 
 3. Id. 
3
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and capacity to employ its privileges without abuse.  It requires 
as a basic discipline the moral obligation to seek the facts without 
prejudice and to spread knowledge without malicious intent.”4  In 
1948, by virtue of Article 19 of the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the parties thereto declared, “[e]veryone [every 
individual and every organ in society] has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.”5 
By 1966, international treaties expressed the right to 
information as a fundamental first generation right.  The global 
community framed the right to information as a civil and political 
right.  By virtue of Article 19(2), State parties to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
agreed that, “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through 
any other media of his choice.”6 
In their normative context, international declarations 
proclaimed the right to information as a fundamental human 
right but international actors still did not necessarily consider 
international norms binding or effective.  They could not be 
legally effective if they did not have legal force.  A number of U.N. 
member states recognized that anchoring legal rules to protect 
individual rights to seek, receive, and impart information was one 
avenue that could facilitate the fulfillment of international 
norms.  Discussions ensued.  Dialogue within U.N. corridors 
raised the potential to put an international treaty on the freedom 
of information on the negotiating table, but such a treaty has 
never come to fruition. 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 
1966). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/4
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In 1965, the U.N. General Assembly recognized that the right 
to information was important, but not important enough.  It had, 
in its words, too “heavy [an] agenda” to consider either the 
submitted draft Convention on Freedom of Information or the 
draft Declaration on Freedom of Information, and “decide[d] to 
devote . . . as much time as it deems necessary to the 
consideration of the item on freedom of information” at its next 
session.7  In 1970, the U.N. General Assembly acknowledged that 
the draft Convention on the Freedom of Information had been 
sitting on its table for “eighteen years” and decided to give it 
priority at its next session.8  Future U.N. sessions were of a 
similar resolve.  Diplomacy prevailed. 
Parties to the U.N. recognize the emergence of a new world 
information order as a fundamental right but putting it into effect 
is difficult.  The process is slow.  In diplomatic parlance, it is an 
“evolving and continuous process.”9  In 2010, the U.N.’s General 
Assembly reaffirmed as much when it remarked that it had a 
“commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and to the principles of freedom of the press and freedom 
of information,” but limited that commitment to 
recommendations.10 
Notwithstanding, the U.N.’s 2010 General Assembly 
resolution on “Questions Relating to Information, Information in 
the Service of Humanity, and the United Nations Public 
Information Policies and Activities” was an important step 
forward.  The General Assembly urged all stakeholders, including 
countries, U.N. organizations, and the media to “cooperate and 
interact with a view to reducing existing disparities in 
information flows at all levels . . . and to ensure the free flow of 
information at all levels.”11  The U.N. General Assembly 
reinforced this message in December 2011 when it requested 
 
 7. Freedom of Information, G.A. Res. 2061 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2061 (Dec. 
16, 1965). 
 8. Freedom of Information, G.A. Res. 2722 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2722 
(Dec. 15, 1970). 
 9. G.A. Res. 65/107, A-B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/107 (Dec. 10, 2010). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
5
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the Department of Public Information and its network of United 
Nations information centres to pay particular attention to 
progress in implementing the internationally agreed 
development goals, including those contained in the Millennium 
Declaration, and the outcomes of the major related United 
Nations summits and conferences in carrying out its activities, 
and calls upon the Department to play an active role in raising 
public awareness of . . . the global challenge of climate change, in 
particular the actions taken within the framework of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, especially in 
the context of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities . . . .12 
Several crosscutting second-generation human rights’ 
instruments also incorporate a right to information.  For the 
purposes of this Article, second-generation human rights’ 
instruments refer to legal instruments that give impetus to 
economic, social, and cultural equality.  Certain treaties recognize 
the rights of women, children, and the disabled to information. 
The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) recognizes the right of 
“[a]ccess to specific educational information to help to ensure the 
health and well-being of families . . . .”13  The 1989 Convention on 
the Rights of the Child provides for the right of the child to 
“receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers . . . .”14  The 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities endows people with extra needs with a right to 
information.15 
Typically voiced as positive rights, the rights to information 
aforementioned prescribe social conduct.  Positive rights oblige 
 
 12. Questions relating to information, G.A. Res. 66/81 A-B, at 4, U.N. GAOR, 
66th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/81 A-B (Dec. 9, 2011). 
 13. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, at 193, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. 
Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979). 
 14. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, at 167, 
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989). 
 15. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, 
art. 9(2)(f), U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/4
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action.  Negative rights curtail action.16  To illustrate the 
distinction, consider the 2006 Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.  Parties to the 2006 Convention agreed, 
inter alia, to “promote other appropriate forms of assistance and 
support to persons with disabilities to ensure their access to 
information.”17  The parties thereto also agreed to “take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities can 
exercise the right to freedom of expression and opinion, including 
the freedom to seek, receive and impart information . . . .”18  
“Promoting appropriate forms of assistance” and “taking all 
appropriate measures” are expressions of positive rights. 
While the right to seek, receive, and impart information is a 
fundamental human right, that right is subject to certain limits.  
There is no right to incite racial divides or hatred.  There is no 
right to use information as a vehicle for corruption.  
Informational relevancy is important, but so too is its discipline. 
For the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) “information . . . is a vital factor in the 
strengthening of peace and international understanding”; but it 
should be subject to a certain degree of discipline.19  UNESCO’s 
1978 Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the 
Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and 
International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights 
and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War, 
is illustrative.  It provides in its very first article that, “[t]he 
strengthening of peace and international understanding, the 
promotion of human rights and the countering of racialism, 
apartheid and incitement to war demand a free flow and a wider 
and better balanced dissemination of information.”20 
 
 16. John Stuart Mill once spoke of positive and negative liberties. See 
generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1982). 
 17. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 15, at 
art. 9(2)(f). 
 18. Id. art. 21. 
 19. Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of 
the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to 
the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and 
Incitement to War, UNESCO Res. 4/9.3/2 (Nov. 28, 1978). 
 20. Id. 
7
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The U.N.’s 2003 Convention Against Corruption, which 
entered into force in 2005, also contains a number of provisions 
concerning the “right to information.”21  In its hortatory 
language, the Convention provides for certain guidelines.  Under 
“public reporting,” the Convention Against Corruption provides 
support for public access measures on decision-making 
concerning public interests.22  On the issue of “participation of 
society,” the Convention Against Corruption provides that the 
participation of non-state actors be strengthened by “ensuring 
that the public has effective access to information.”23 
On February 3, 2010, a group of preeminent rapporteurs on 
the Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Freedom of the 
Media, and the Access to Information issued a joint declaration 
identifying the central challenges to freedom of expression over 
the coming decade.24  Rapporteurs from the U.N., the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the African 
Commission listed “Limits on the Right to Information” among 
the ten key challenges over the coming decade.25  The U.N., the 
OAS, the OSCE, and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights recognized further that “some 50 laws [have] been 
passed in the last ten years” but the right to information is often 
expressed without guarantee.  In many States, right to 
 
 21. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, art. 10(a), U.N. GAOR, 
58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/422 (Oct. 31, 2003); see also TRANSPARENCY 
INT’L, USING THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION AS AN ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOL (Nurhan 
Kocaoglu, et al. eds. 2006), available at http://www.oas.org/dil/access_to_i 
nformation_human_Policy_Recommendations_Transparency_International_Rig
ht_to_Information_as_an_Anti-Corruption_Tool.pdf 
 22. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 21. 
 23. Id. art. 13(1)(b). 
 24. The rapporteurs included the U.N.’s Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. 
 25. Press Release, Org. of Am. States Inter-American Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
2010: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade, U.N. 
Press Release No. R18/10 (2010). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/4
  
148 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
information laws are weak; and then there is “[t]he massive 
challenge of implementing the right to information in practice.”26 
Endeavors to transpose and bind the right to information 
also exist at regional and national levels.  According to its 
website, the non-governmental organization Article 19 defends 
and promotes freedom of expression and freedom of information 
globally.  Article 19 reported in 2010 that “over 90 countries have 
adopted RTI [right to information] laws.”27  A similar impetus 
drives regional groupings.  Developments in Africa, the Americas, 
and Europe are illustrative. 
In terms of national endeavors, several countries have 
tailored freedom of information laws to address specific issues.  
The French law of July 17, 1978 recognizes the right for all 
persons to obtain administrative documents (the Commission 
d’Accès aux Documents Administratifs manages the process).28  
In England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the Freedom of 
Information Act of 2000 gives citizens a right of access to 
information held by public authorities (the U.K.’s Office of the 
Information Commissioner regulates the implementation of the 
Freedom of Information Act and fulfills a proactive obligation of 
research, education, and public awareness).29  The U.S. has 
adopted a Freedom of Information Act that provides agency rules 
for making public information available (the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Information Policy oversees agency 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. XIX ARTICLE 19, THE ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INDEX 1 
(2010), available at http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/press/rti-index.pdf. 
 28. Loi 78-753 du 17 Juillet 1978 Portant Diverses Mesures d’amélioration 
Des Relations Entre l’Administration et le Public et Diverses Dispositions 
d’ordre Administratif, Social et Fiscal, Titre Ier: De la Liberté d'Accès aux 
Documents Administratifs et de la Réutilisation des Informations Publiques 
[Law 78-753 of July 17, 1978 on Various Measure to Improve Relations Between 
the Administration and the Public and Various Administrative, Social and 
Fiscal, Title I: Freedom of Access to Administrative Documents and Reuse of 
Public Information], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 17, 1978.  The Commission d’Accès aux 
Documents Administratifs manages the process. 
 29. Freedom of Information Act of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
2000, c. 36 (U.K.).  The U.K.’s Office of the Information Commissioner regulates 
the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act and fulfills a proactive 
obligation of research, education, and public awareness. 
9
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compliance).30  These national laws typically reinforce the 
public’s “right to know” subject to certain specified exceptions, 
such as public safety, public health, and defense. 
In terms of regional endeavors, Article 9(1) of the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights of 1981 provides for the 
right to information.31  In 2002, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, meeting at its thirty-second 
Ordinary Session, in Banjul, Gambia, reinforced this right.32  
Principle IV of the Declaration of Principles of Freedom of 
Expression in African States declares: “Public bodies hold 
information not for themselves but as custodians of the public 
good and everyone has a right to access this information, subject 
only to clearly defined rules established by law.”33 
In the Americas, Article 13 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights of 1969 incorporates the right to information 
within provisions on the Freedom of Thought and Expression.34  
More recently, on January 13, 2004, the heads of state and 
government of the Americas adopted the Nuevo León Declaration.  
The parties thereto declared, inter alia, that “access to 
information held by the State, subject to constitutional and legal 
norms, including those on privacy and confidentiality, is an 
indispensable condition for citizen participation and promotes 
effective respect for human rights.”35 
In Europe, the 1950 European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides for the 
freedom of expression.  Article 10 of the Convention provides for a 
qualified right.  Article 10(1) incorporates a right to the “freedom 
 
 30. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. IV 2012) (the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Information Policy oversees agency 
compliance). 
 31. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 
U.N.T.S. 217. 
 32. See Resolution on the Adoption of the Declaration of Principles on 
Freedom of Expression in Africa, Afr. Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, 32d 
Sess., art. IV(1) (Oct.17-23, 2002). 
 33. Id. 
 34. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123. 
 35. Declaration of Nuevo León Special Summit of the Americas Monterrey, 
Mexico (Jan. 13, 2004), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/summits/mont 
errey/nleon_e.asp. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/4
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to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers.”36  Article 10(2) conditions the right, in accordance with 
laws that are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.37 
In 1970, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly 
adopted a declaration on mass communication media and human 
rights.  The Declaration establishes a European wide principle of 
transparency and reinforces the right to information.38  The 
Declaration provides, inter alia, that the right to freedom of 
expression include “the freedom to seek, receive, impart, publish 
and distribute information and ideas” and that “[t]here shall be a 
corresponding duty for the public authorities to make available 
information on matters of public interest within reasonable limits 
. . . .”39  Europeans annexed another Declaration on the right of 
access to information to the 1992 Treaty on European Union, 
known as the Treaty of Maastricht.40 
Further developments have also occurred at a treaty level.  
The 2000 Treaty of Lisbon conferred on the European Union’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights the same value as a legally 
binding treaty when it entered into force on December 1, 2009.41  
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
provides for the freedom of expression and information.42  Article 
 
 36. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1953), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/ 
html/005.htm. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Res. No. 428 (1970). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Treaty on European Union, 1992 O.J. (C 191). 
 41. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 
364). 
 42. Id. 
11
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11 thereto stipulates, “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression.  This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”43 
Supplementary instruments are also relevant.  In 2009, for 
instance, the Council of Europe’s Convention on Access to Official 
Documents was opened for member state signature, for accession 
by non-member states, and for accession by any international 
organization.44  The Convention on Access to Official Documents 
provides for rights of access subject to certain limitations, such as 
the necessity to protect national security, defense, and 
international relations.45 
The preceding instruments, many of which entail normative 
guarantees of a right to information, demonstrate the nature of 
objective equity.  They illustrate the link between international 
human rights and the right to information but they do not give 
effect to equity in and of their own accord.  Balancing 
contradistinctions between the relevancy and disciplines 
governing the right to information is also needed to inform a 
theory of justice for the global commons, collective human rights, 
and rights for future generations included.  Giving effect to the 
right to information in international environmental law will also 
inform governance of the right to information in climate law.  
Before examining the nature of “effect” in more detail, the next 
section places the right to information within the framework of 
international environmental law. 
 
 43. Id. art. 11(1); Id. art. 11(2) (providing that the freedom and pluralism of 
the media shall also be respected). 
 44. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, art. 2(1)(c), 
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26-32. 
 45. Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, CETS No. 
205 (2009), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulez 
Vous.asp?NT=205&CM=1&CL=ENG. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/4
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B. International Environmental Law and the Right to 
 Information 
1. To Give With One Hand . . . 
Besides the framework context of international human rights 
law, environmental law also informs the right to information in 
international climate law.  Parties to the Stockholm Declaration 
declared specific non-state actor rights to information (Principle 
19), and they strengthened their resolve to technology transfer 
(Principle 20).46  Principles 10 and 19 of the 1992 Rio Declaration 
reiterated and expanded on the Stockholm Declaration’s 
provisions for the right to information by reinforcing individual 
and public rights (Principle 10).47  Rio Principle 19 elaborates on 
state responsibility to provide timely environmental notifications 
and relevant environmental information.48 
Adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) in Rio, Section IV, Chapter 40, of 
Agenda 21, entitled “Information for Decision-Making,” links the 
relevancy of information to disciplining the application thereof.49  
Agenda 21 grounded the right to information even further by 
setting out a number of relevant core activities.  Amongst others, 
these actions include establishing a comprehensive information 
framework.  Giving effect to such a framework requires making 
institutional changes at the national level, strengthening 
environmental assessments, and strengthening the capacity for 
traditional information and indigenous knowledge.50 
Advocates for a World Charter for Nature were also coming 
to the fore in the intervening periods between the Stockholm and 
Rio Declarations.  In essence, humankind advances by protecting 
 
 46. United Nation Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 
Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972). 
 47. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id.  Agenda 21 is a non-binding policy statement adopted at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio. 
 50. Id. §§ 40.10, 40.11. 
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and safeguarding nature’s qualities.  In 1982, the General 
Assembly proclaimed that “States and, to the extent they are 
able, other public authorities, international organizations, 
individuals, groups and corporations shall: co-operate in the task 
of conserving nature through common activities and other 
relevant actions, including information exchange and 
consultations.”51 
By 1994, there was evidence of a growing momentum to 
recognize a formal link between the right to information in the 
domain of human rights and the right to information in the 
environmental domain.  Attempts to discipline the right to 
environmental information are featured in the 1994 Draft 
Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the 
Environment.52  The 1994 Draft recognizes the link between 
information, conduct, participation, and decision-making.53  A 
further provision requires that, “information shall be timely, 
clear, understandable and available without undue financial 
burden to the applicant.”54 
The intertwining of equitable rights as both human and 
environmental rights was to continue throughout the ensuing 
decade.  In 2004, the Commission on Environmental Law of the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
presented a Draft International Covenant on Environment and 
Development to the U.N. General Assembly.55  The Draft 
Covenant contained several provisions on the right to 
information.  For example, Article 45 thereto, entitled 
“Information and Knowledge,” provides for the exchange of 
 
 51. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, ¶ 21(a), U.N. GAOR, 37th 
Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982). 
 52. U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Final Report Prepared by Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special 
Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (July 6, 1994). 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. pt. III(15). 
 55. See IUCN Envtl. Law Programme, Comm’n on Envtl. Law of IUCN- 
World Conservation Union, Draft International Covenant on Environment and 
Development (Envtl. Policy & Law Paper No. 31, 3d ed. 2004), available at 
http://home.moravian.edu/public/infocus/NEW/Resources/11-08-30_St.John_dra 
ft_covenant.pdf.  
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publically available information.56  In addition, the Covenant 
requires the parties to obtain “prior informed consent” from local 
communities before accessing traditional knowledge of indigenous 
communities.57 
The international community also made advances in 
development crosscutting sectoral rights to environmental 
information.  As a result, equity and the inclusion of right to 
information provisions in international treaties grew in 
prominence.  The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer (1987),58 the U.N.’s Convention to Combat 
Desertification (1994),59 and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (1992),60 and its associated 2002 “Bonn Guidelines,”61 
are symbolic of such headway. 
At a regional level, the European Union’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights binds member states to integrate a “high 
level of environmental protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment” into Union policies and ensure this obligation 
in “accordance with the principle of sustainable development.”62  
The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe’s (UNECE) 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
1998 (Aarhus Convention) establishes a European-wide right to 
give effect to equity in environmental matters by encompassing 
 
 56. Id. art. 45. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 9, 
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989). 
 59. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 
June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 26, 1996). 
 60. See Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 17, June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79. 
 61. See Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
The Hague, Neth., Apr. 7-19, 2002, Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention of Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (May 27, 2002). 
 62. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 41, 
art. 37. 
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provisions for access to information, public participation in 
decision-making, and access to justice.63 
Kofi Annan also identified with the broader context of 
subjective equity.  In speaking about the Aarhus Convention, the 
former Secretary-General of the United Nations (1997-2006), 
observed in 2000 that “[a]lthough regional in scope, the 
significance of the Aarhus Convention is global.  It is by far the 
most impressive elaboration of principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration, which stresses the need for citizen’s participation in 
environmental issues and for access to information on the 
environment held by public authorities.”64  The Aarhus 
Convention may have global significance but is it robust enough 
to support a new architecture for third generation rights to 
information and “people’s rights” to information, in international 
climate law?  This Article suggests that it may be robust enough 
to facilitate a more universal architecture provided it situates 
within an appropriate context: the constitutionalism of 
international climate law needs to account for both objective and 
subjective equitable thresholds. 
To support implementation of the Aarhus Convention, the 
UNECE has prepared a comprehensive set of guidelines.65  Three 
supplementary European instruments also facilitate 
implementation.  Directive 2003/4/EC provides for access to 
environmental information.66  Directive 2003/35/EC provides for 
public participation in environmental programs.67  European 
Commission Regulation (EC Regulation) 1367/2006, or the 
“Aarhus Regulation,” extends EC Regulation No. 1049/2001 from 
providing for general public access to European Parliament, 
 
 63. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 
U.N.T.S. 447 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention]. 
 64. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation 
Guide, at v, U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/72, U.N. Sales No. E.00.II.E.3 (2000). 
 65. See id. 
 66. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, 2003 O.J. 
(L 41) 26. 
 67. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/35/EC, Providing 
for Public Participation in Respect of the Drawing Up of Certain Plans and 
Programmes Relating to the Environment and Amending with Regard to Public 
Participation and Access to Justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 
96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 156) 17. 
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Council, and Commission documents and principles, and limits 
governing access thereto, to provisions regulating public access to 
information on environmental matters held by all community 
institutions and bodies.68  The Aarhus Regulation requires that 
community institutions and bodies provide for public 
participation in the preparation, modification, or review of “plans 
and programmes relating to the environment.”69  It also enables 
certified non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to request an 
internal review.70 
The “European Transparency Initiative,” launched on 
November 9, 2005, also supplements de jure rights to 
information.  The European Transparency Initiative disciplines 
three aspects of the right to information: transparency and 
interest representation, minimum standards for consultation, and 
publication of data on beneficiaries of EU Funds.71  The initiative 
includes a review of EC Regulation No. 1049/2001 concerning 
general public access to specified institutions.72  However, in 
interpreting Europe’s transparency policy in environmental law, 
the Aarhus Regulation (EC Regulation 1367/2006) shall prevail in 
case of divergence. 
In terms of disciplining the right to information, the Aarhus 
Convention contains provisions for integrity, transparency, and 
government accountability.73  While the Aarhus Convention 
collates provisions on information, transparency, and 
accountability as already considered by international treaties—
such as those aforementioned thresholds of subjective equity 
governing ozone depletion, desertification, and biodiversity—it 
 
 68. Commission Regulation 1367/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 264) 13, 14 (EC); see also 
Commission Regulation 1049/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43 (EU); Commission 
Decision 2008/50/EC, 2007 O.J. (L 13) 16; Commission Decision 2008/401/EC, 
2008 O.J. (L 140) 30. 
 69. Commission Regulation 1367/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 264) 13, 14. 
 70. Id. at 15. 
 71. Comm’n of the European Communities, Green Paper: European 
Transparency Initiative 3-4 (2006). 
 72. Comm’n of the European Communities, Green Paper: Public Access to 
Documents Held by Institutions of the European Community 3 (2007). 
 73. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63. 
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builds on those provisions by incorporating several important 
modernizations.74 
As aforementioned, the parties to the Aarhus Convention 
acknowledge three main pillars that guarantee the objectivity of 
effective justice. 
In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every 
person of present and future generations to live in an 
environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, each 
Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public 
participation in decision-making, and access to justice in 
environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention.75 
Upholding the integrity of these three pillars is fundamental to 
fulfill equity in its subjective context. 
The Aarhus Convention’s implementing apparatus reinforces 
its recognition of access to information as a fundamental right.  
In 2008, at the third meeting of the parties to the Aarhus 
Convention, which culminated in the adoption of the Riga 
Declaration, the parties thereto elaborated on this fundamental 
right declaring: 
Public access to information, as well as being a right in itself, is 
essential for meaningful public participation and access to 
justice. When properly implemented, the right to information 
leads on the one hand to more transparent, accountable 
government and on the other to a more informed, 
environmentally aware public.76 
In essence, conduct that gives effect to the Aarhus 
Convention’s right to information is two-fold.  First, there is an 
obligation on public authorities to respond to information 
 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. art. 1. 
 76. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Riga, Lat., June 11-13, 
2008, Report of the Third Meeting of the Parties-Addendum to Riga Declaration, 
§ 9, ECE/MP.PP/2008/2/Add.1 (Sept. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Addendum to Riga 
Declaration]; see also Svitlana Kravchenko, The Aarhus Convention and 
Innovations in Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 18 
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2007). 
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requests.77  Second, there is an obligation on the parties to collect 
and disseminate accurate environmental information.78 
The first obligation entails a responsive or reactive obligation 
on public authorities whereby external stakeholders are typically, 
but not always, the initiator of the request.  Reactive obligations 
contrast with passive obligations insofar that they require some 
level of engagement with the actor initiating the request and a 
visible reaction that produces results.  The second obligation 
entails an anticipatory or proactive obligation on public 
authorities whereby public authorities are typically, but not 
always, the initiator of the inquiry.  As such, the second 
obligation facilitates the way for public authorities to control and 
manage their climate change mandate instead of responding on 
an ad hoc basis to an influx of requests. 
In assessing this mix of reactive and proactive obligations, 
and as a forerunner for meaningful public participation and 
access to justice, it is useful to examine the relevancy and 
disciplines governing environmental information.  The analysis 
proceeds by assessing the parameters of “environmental 
information.”  It also examines the degree to which public 
authorities honor their proactive and reactive obligations in 
practice.  In other words, it applies a subjective test. 
The definition of “environmental information” establishes the 
parameters of the “environmental information” in question.  
Within the “Aarhus” context, “environmental information” means 
any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other 
material form on: 
 
(a) The state of elements of the environment, such as air and 
atmosphere, water . . .; 
 
(b) Factors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, and 
activities or measures, including administrative measures, 
environmental agreements, policies, legislation, plans and 
programmes, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the 
environment within the scope of subparagraph (a) above, and 
 
 77. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 4. 
 78. Id. art. 5. 
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cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used 
in environmental decision-making; 
 
(c) The state of human health and safety, conditions of human 
life, cultural sites and built structures, inasmuch as they are or 
may be affected by the state of the elements of the environment 
or, through these elements, by the factors, activities or measures 
referred to in subparagraph (b) above.79 
Subject to expressing justification for a delay due to the 
complexity of the subject, the main rule in terms of responding to 
requests for environmental information is that a public authority 
must provide environmental information to the applicant within 
one month of the submission of the request.80  Public authorities 
may refuse to provide the requested environmental information 
if, amongst others, they do not hold the information requested; if 
the request is manifestly unreasonable or too general; due to a 
certain number of public interest, national defense or public 
security exceptions; due to a breach of personal confidentiality 
laws; or, due to breaches of intellectual property rights.81  In the 
event of not meeting the request, the public authority is obliged to 
inform the applicant of where the applicant may obtain the 
relevant information or the rationale for refusal.82 
To recall, collection and dissemination of data that will 
inform citizens of their rights is an anticipatory obligation 
intrinsic to the Aarhus Convention.83  Each party thereto is to 
ensure that “public authorities possess and update environmental 
information which is relevant to their functions.”84  There is a 
duty on the parties to provide a rapid alert system in response to 
environmental information that may adversely affect the 
environment or human health. 
Another advantage of the Aarhus Convention is that it 
provides for a far more streamlined “ease of use” policy.  Parties 
are encouraged to make use of electronic databases and publish 
 
 79. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 2(3). 
 80. Id. art. 4(2). 
 81. Id. art. 4(3)-(4). 
 82. Id. art. 4(5). 
 83. Id. art. 5. 
 84. Id. art. 5(1)(a). 
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information online.85  The Riga Declaration (2008) recognizes 
that “[e]lectronic tools have dramatically increased the 
possibilities for putting environmental information in the public 
domain, but their potential has yet to be fully realized.”86 
These reactive and proactive obligations are not, however, 
isolated to state parties.  Liability under the Aarhus Convention 
for the collection and dissemination of information and response 
to requests of course resides with the contracting parties.  
Notwithstanding, the Convention provides indirect rights of 
access for non-state actors.  After all, non-state actors may have a 
significant impact on the environment. For instance, if an 
“operator’s” “activities” “have a significant impact on the 
environment,” then the contracting party is obligated to 
encourage those operators “to inform the public regularly of the 
environmental impact of their activities and products, where 
appropriate within the framework of voluntary eco-labelling or 
eco-auditing schemes or by other means.”87 
While not defining the term “operator,” the Convention is 
flexible enough to extend beyond state-to-state responsibility by 
encompassing guidelines for other actors in a state to non-state 
relation.  As a result, activities of a non-state party may invoke 
responsibility on the contracting party via instruments, such as 
environmental impact assessments.  To quote Sands, 
[A]n environmental impact assessment describes a process which 
produces a written statement to be used to guide decision-
making, with several related functions.  First, it should provide 
decision-makers with information on the environmental 
consequences of proposed activities and, in some cases, 
programmes and policies, and their alternatives.  Secondly, it 
requires decisions to be influenced by that information.  And, 
thirdly, it provides a mechanism for ensuring the participation of 
potentially affected persons in the decision-making process.88 
 
 85. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 5(3). 
 86. Addendum to Riga Declaration, supra note 76, § 10. 
 87. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 5(6). 
 88. PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 800 
(2d ed. 2003). 
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These interactions support and strengthen shared responsibility.  
By linking the right to environmental information to 
environmental impact assessments, the Aarhus Convention 
supports this interpretation within its objective context (as a type 
of substantive guarantee) and subjectively (if conduct is timely 
and gives effect to normative guarantees). 
Even if the proposed objective element of equity is right, the 
maxim donner et retenir ne vaut suggests that the norm may still 
not be valid.  In certain circumstances equity may not be put into 
effect.  In addition, and especially concerning the birthright of 
future generations, there needs to be some sort of safeguard to 
ensure that competent authorities issuing a legal norm do not 
take back what is given if there is later a regret, or if the 
relationship between the parties changes.  Similarly, if competent 
authorities never make the legal norm effective then the outcome 
is precisely one of not validating the legal norm.  One has given 
with one hand and taken away with the other. 
2. . . . And to Take Away With the Other 
A certain number of lessons drawn from the European 
context may perhaps be useful for developing an effective and 
universal right to information within the global commons, and, 
more precisely, within the constitutionalism of international 
climate law.  In returning to Europe, it was somewhat doubtful 
prior to the Aarhus Convention (1998) whether Article 10 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) was a successful mechanism for 
disciplining the right to environmental information by the 
enforcement of proactive and reactive obligations.  In application, 
the European Court of Human Rights seemed to distinguish 
between positive and negative rights.  (To recall, a positive right 
obliges action and a negative right obliges curtail of an action). 
It is important to make a distinction, however, between the 
framework that governs proactive and reactive obligations and 
that which governs positive and negative rights.  To exhibit the 
practicalities of the “willingness and capacity” to discipline 
information for effective justice, insofar as a subjective test is 
concerned, this subsection will reference several cases of the 
European Court of Human Rights concerning environmental law.  
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/4
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Examples show that European jurisprudence is yet to harness a 
consistent recognition of proactive and reactive obligations 
regarding the right to information. 
Bladet Tromsø & Stensaas v. Norway (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999) is 
a case in point.89  In Bladet Tromsø, the issue was whether the 
press should have the freedom of expression to publish a report 
commissioned by Norway’s Ministry of Fisheries on seal hunting 
or whether the protection of a seal hunter’s reputation should be 
the prevailing consideration.90  Norway mooted that the 
protection of seal hunters’ reputation should prevail.91  Whereas, 
the press considered that their interests and those of the seals 
were paramount.92 
While recognizing that the debate was of public interest, the 
Norwegian government claimed that the press launched the 
report in question in a sensationalist way.  The government 
claimed that the press aimed to launch a personal attack against 
the hunters.93  One famous headline even read, “Shock report . . . 
Seals skinned alive.”94  Norway was of the view that Article 10 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950), which provides for freedom of 
expression, should not extend to the degree of harming human 
livelihoods and private individuals.95  The press leaned on animal 
right’s interests, the public’s right to know, and a duty to 
disclose.96 
In deciding the case, the European Court of Human Rights 
turned to the test of “necessity in a democratic society.”97  The 
Court remarked thus: 
[W]hilst the mass media must not overstep the bounds imposed 
in the interests of the protection of the reputation of private 
 
 89. Bladet Tromsø & Stensaas v. Norway, App. No. 21980/93, 29 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 125 (2000). 
 90. See generally id. 
 91. Id. at 128. 
 92. See generally id.  
 93. Id. at 165. 
 94. Id. at 134. 
 95. Id. at 153. 
 96. Id. at 167. 
 97. Bladet Tromsø, App. No. 21980/93, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 125. 
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individuals, it is incumbent on them to impart information and 
ideas concerning matters of public interest.  Not only does the 
press have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the 
public also has a right to receive them.98 
Public interest was vital to ensure an informed public debate 
locally, nationally, and internationally, and trumped protecting 
the seal hunter’s interests and their respective reputations.  By 
extension, the European Court of Human Rights held that there 
had been a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,99 
and that the public had a right to be aware and informed of the 
report commissioned by Norway’s Ministry of Fisheries on seal 
hunting.  In these circumstances, the Norwegian government 
could not invoke a negative right to curtail action by silencing the 
press and prohibiting publication.  Further, there was no reactive 
(responsive) obligation on the government to inform.  As to the 
press, however, a positive right was invoked obliging action, and 
a proactive (anticipatory) obligation was invoked on the mass 
media to collect and disseminate information.  There was a 
positive right and proactive obligation incumbent on the press to 
inform. 
Environmental information and Article 10 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms had come under scrutiny by the European Court of 
Human Rights a year earlier.  One may consider two relevant 
questions extracted from the 1998 Guerra & Others v. Italy 
dispute.100  As a reactive (responsive) obligation, should public 
authorities respond to citizens’ requests for information about the 
potential hazards of living near a high-risk fertilizer factory that 
released harmful toxins into the air and was prone to accidents?  
As a proactive (anticipatory) obligation, should public authorities 
inform local residents about the consequences of living near the 
factory?  As both obligations would oblige action, they reflect the 
procedural enforcement of a positive right. 
 
 98. Id. at 126-27. 
 99. Id. at 130. 
 100. Guerra & Others v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357 (1998). 
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It was known through reports “that the emission treatment 
equipment was inadequate and the environmental-impact 
assessment incomplete.”101  Further, there was a record of prior 
accidents.  To recall, on one occasion several tons of potassium 
carbonate and bicarbonate solution, containing arsenic trioxide, 
escaped into the atmosphere resulting in the hospitalization of 
150 people with acute arsenic poisoning.102  Did this ‘know-how’ 
invoke an extended proactive obligation on public authorities to 
inform about the “state of elements of the environment” following 
such disaster?  Now, this question is somewhat complex because 
it invokes both anticipatory and responsive elements, i.e. action 
in anticipation of a future disaster and action in response to a 
preceding disaster. 
“In circumstances such as those of the present case,”103 did 
the local population have a right to be informed about the risk 
factors, the factors affecting or likely to affect the elements of the 
environment, and to be advised as to what to do in the event of 
future accidents?  Did the public have the right to be informed 
about the state of human health and safety?   
Public authorities were not proactive.  There was no 
anticipatory action taken by the government to collect and 
disseminate information.  There was therefore no action to inform 
the public.   
Citizens were proactive.  They requested information from 
the relevant public authorities about the risks of future disasters.  
Citizens thereby claimed a reactive obligation on public 
authorities to respond.  The relevant public authorities refused 
the information requests. 
Two questions delimiting proactive and reactive obligations 
come to bear.  First, could the right for citizens to know ever 
invoke a reactive (responsive) obligation, and thereby a test of 
“necessity in a democratic society,” say, in the interests of public 
safety, in the interests of protecting human health, or in the 
interests of preventing a severe disruption to the functioning of a 
local community?  Second, could the right to know ever invoke a 
 
 101. Id. at 363. 
 102. Id. at 362. 
 103. Id. at 359. 
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proactive (anticipatory) obligation on public authorities to impart 
information, and thereby a second test of “necessity in a 
democratic society,” say, in the interests of public safety, 
protecting human health, or preventing a severe disruption to the 
functioning of a local community? 
The Court did not entertain such a complete analysis of 
Article 10’s rights and responsibilities.  If it had, however, would 
the outcome have differed?  In the alternative, and being more 
forward looking, could the Court see an evolution in the 
interpretation and application of Article 10 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms that will strengthen citizenship rights and society’s 
interests? 
To answer these questions there is a need for further 
examination.  Consider the duties and responsibilities on the 
right to information as provided for by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
Article 10 of the Convention provides for the “Freedom of 
expression” as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. 
 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties 
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.104 
Now, compare the insights that one may draw from the 
actual findings of the Court.  In terms of the merits of an Article 
 
 104. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 36, art. 10. 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/4
  
166 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
10 violation, the European Court of Human Rights held in Guerra 
& Others v Italy that 
[f]reedom to receive information basically prohibited a 
government from restricting a person from receiving information 
that others wished or might be willing to impart to him - that 
freedom could not be construed as imposing on a State, in 
circumstances such as those of present case, positive obligations 
to collect and disseminate information of its own motion. 105 
There was therefore no violation of Article 10.  The Court 
invoked a negative right that curtails governments from 
restricting the receipt of information from third parties.  In 
addition, the Court revoked any positive right in circumstances 
such as those of the present case that construes a proactive 
(anticipatory) obligation on governments to collect and 
disseminate information.  Only a breach of reactive (responsive) 
obligations in terms of a third party duty to respond could invoke 
a breach of Article 10.  The public had a right to receive 
information, but the government had no corresponding obligation 
by which to discharge that right. 
It may be recalled of Bladet Tromsø, the “seal hunters” case, 
that the press was imputed with a positive proactive obligation to 
“impart information and ideas” about animal health to which the 
public had a right of receipt; and, the government was imputed 
with a negative charge of non-interference.106  There was no 
positive charge and no proactive (anticipatory) obligation on the 
government to inform of its own motion.  Similarly, in Guerra, the 
public had a right to receive information, but the government had 
no positive charge and no proactive obligation to impart 
information about the risks to human health and the mitigation 
of risk. 
Extending one party a right of receipt but not obliging the 
other to give effect to that right may undermine the credibility of 
European human rights and even the development of such rights 
 
 105. Guerra, App. No. 14967/8926, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 359. 
 106. Bladet Tromsø & Stensaas v. Norway, App. No. 21980/93, 29 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 125, 168 (2000). 
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in international law.107  In both European cases human rights to 
information existed, but they did not oblige the competent 
authorities to enforce a right to information.  Human rights to 
know did not invoke a duty to disclose. 
While Article 10 reinforced provisions of objective equity, the 
consequences of weak subjective equity led to other corollaries.  
Another important argument in Guerra recalled the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1087 on the 
consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.108  Adopted on April 26, 
1996, Resolution 1087 states, “public access to clear and full 
information . . . must be viewed as a basic human right.”109  The 
counter-argument was that Resolution 1087 and Directive 
90/313/EEC of the Council of the European Communities on the 
freedom of access to information on the environment 
spoke merely of access, not a right, to information. If a positive 
obligation to provide information existed, it would be “extremely 
difficult to implement” because of the need to determine how and 
when the information was to be disclosed, which authorities were 
responsible for disclosing it and who was to receive it.110 
These are precisely the issues that advances in subjective equity 
ought to try to address.  On its own, an objective test of equity 
does not guarantee justice. 
Some may argue that the Aarhus Convention should rectify 
these deficiencies.  This may be true in certain circumstances.  
While the European Court of Human Rights in Guerra dismissed 
an obligation on public authorities to respond to information 
requests,111 and was adamant that there was no proactive 
(anticipatory) obligation on public authorities to collect and 
disseminate accurate environmental information,112 the Aarhus 
 
 107. See U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Protection of Persons in Event of Disasters: Text 
of Draft Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 as Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting 
Committee, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.758 (July 24, 2009) (assigning a duty for States 
and intergovernmental organizations to respect persons’ rights while assisting 
after a disaster). 
 108. Guerra, App. No. 14967/8926, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 367. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 381. 
 111. Id. at 359. 
 112. Id. 
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Convention was not invoked.  It did not apply at that time.  
Guerra was a 1998 case and the Aarhus Convention did not enter 
into force until October 30, 2001.113 
Although an Article 10, Freedom of Expression, provision 
could not invoke proactive (anticipatory) obligations for a state’s 
public apparatus to impart information “of its own motion,” the 
European Court of Human Rights considered that there might be 
positive obligations inherent in Article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedom.114  Article 8 provides for respect to private and family 
life.115  Concluding in Guerra, the Court held that the Italian 
authorities had failed in their positive obligations to secure 
respect for the applicants’ private and family life and, by 
extension, violated Article 8 (but not Article 10).116  The Court 
thereby found that there was an indirect right to information 
albeit within an Article 8 argument.117 
Is the finding in Guerra an isolated instance or could it be 
said that Article 8 now encompasses an indirect right to 
information?  Moreover, what other human rights provisions in 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms incorporate an indirect right to 
information or do all articles incorporate an indirect right to 
information?  Consequently, is subjective equity a universal 
human right?  The following section will start to assess the 
potential answers to these questions. 
3. Donner et Retenir ne Vaut 
Under scrutiny, several other cases of the European Court of 
Human Rights evoke the same line of reasoning as that found in 
Guerra & Others v. Italy.  McGinley & Egan v. United Kingdom 
(1998) illuminates the subject.  The findings in McGinley pivot on 
 
 113. Jeremy Wates, Aarhus Convention Starts Count-Down to Entry Into 
Force, U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., Aug. 9, 2001, http://www.unece.org/press/pr 
2001/01env06e.html. 
 114. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 36, art. 8, 10. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Guerra, App. No. 14967/8926, Eur. Ct. H.R. 357 at 360. 
 117. Id. 
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the United Kingdom’s Christmas Island nuclear tests and the 
right of allegedly afflicted service personnel to the full benefit of 
government services thereafter.118  Here too, the Court decided in 
terms of applicability that Article 8 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(the right to respect private and family lives) embodied a right to 
information, but not necessarily a proactive (anticipatory) 
obligation on the government to fulfill that right.119 
In unraveling this finding, recall that “[b]etween 1952 and 
1967 the United Kingdom carried out a number of atmospheric 
tests of nuclear weapons in the Pacific Ocean and at Maralinga, 
Australia, involving over 20,000 servicemen.”120  A number of 
service personnel suffered dire health consequences subsequent 
to the tests.121  Whether or not they would have suffered the 
same health effects if they had not participated in the tests is 
moot.  In any event, the servicemen believed that they were 
entitled to receive government support.122 
To give effect to their claim the servicemen sought 
information about the possible connections between the nuclear 
tests, human health, and their right to government services.123  
For the U.K. government, no such right was admissible unless a 
correct procedure was followed.124  The servicemen struggled to 
work their way through the administrative process.125  In this 
regard, a distinction must be made about the objective content (of 
the information or procedure) and the conduct (that which would 
fulfill or give effect to the intended object or purpose). 
The Court found that the U.K. government had provided a 
procedure by which the servicemen could access documents 
 
 118. McGinley & Egan v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 7-12 (1999) (revised on Jan. 28, 2000). 
 119. Id. at 44. 
 120. McGinley, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5. 
 121. Roff, S.R., Mortality and Morbidity of Members of the British Nuclear 
Tests Veterans Association and the New Zealand Nuclear Tests Veterans 
Association and Their Families, MED., CONFLICT, & SURVIVAL, July – Sept. 1999, 
at 1-51.  
 122. McGinley, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 49. 
 123. Id. at 1. 
 124. Id. at 4. 
 125. Id. 
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relevant to the tests.126  An objective test was met.  As a result, 
there was no requirement for the U.K. to answer to the claim of a 
violation of Article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.127  The 
procedure may have been relevant, but there was no discipline as 
to ease of use or timeliness.128 
The finding in McGinley & Egan v. United Kingdom is not 
the same as saying that there was a positive obligation on the 
U.K. to avail servicemen of information pertaining to the health 
consequences of their participation in nuclear tests.  Not everyone 
asserted this view.129  Judges De Meyer, Valticos, and Morenilla 
dissented.130  In their joint dissenting opinion the three judges 
opined that following what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
in August 1945 that no one could have any doubt that nuclear 
weapons were capable of causing long-term health implications 
and even death.131 
Back in 1998, the dissenting judges in McGinley referred to a 
report issued before the nuclear tests in question: “[A] note 
entitled ‘Radiological Safety Regulations, Christmas Island’ of 
March 1958 [stated] that ‘the danger is insidious because the 
effects are not felt immediately and the damage may only become 
apparent after several years.’”132  Judges De Meyer, Valticos, and 
Morenilla opined that there was a positive right, and an 
obligation on the British state “to assume their responsibilities 
towards the people present in the test areas when the explosions 
took place” without the applicants having to ask.133  Such a 
presumption of responsibility would have equated to the 
invocation of a proactive (anticipatory) obligation. 
McGinley, Guerra, and Bladet Tromsø were all decided before 
the Aarhus Convention entered into force on October 30, 2001.  
The Aarhus Convention does not explicitly mention the European 
 
 126. McGinley, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 46. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. McGinley, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 47. 
 133. Id. 
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Court of Human Rights as a dispute resolution body.134  Even so, 
the question remains as to whether after October 30, 2001, the 
Aarhus Convention demonstrates to be such an impressive 
elaboration of the right to information.  Developing and applying 
a framework for such analysis may assist with the answer. 
A potential framework evokes three key issues.  First, in 
embodying a lex specialis regime of equitable rights, does the 
Aarhus Convention isolate dispute resolution to mechanisms 
provided for by the Aarhus Convention?  Second, has the entry 
into force of the Aarhus Convention reinforced Article 10 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Freedom of Expression and the Right to 
Information)?  Or, does Article 8 (Respect for Private and Family 
Life) still incorporate the prevailing provisions on the right to 
information?  Third, do parties to the Aarhus Convention, and the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, recognize the scope of the Aarhus 
Convention to facilitate a framework for invoking direct 
provisions for the subjective test of equitable rights in European 
Human Rights cases?  In other words, what are the linkages 
between the Aarhus Convention and the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
and, moreover, does the Aarhus Convention reinforce 
interpretation of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? 
In turning to the Aarhus Convention, Article 16 thereto 
provides for the Settlement of Disputes between the Parties.135  
The Parties to the Aarhus Convention “shall seek a solution by 
negotiation or by any other means of dispute settlement.”136  If 
resolution is not possible by these means, the Parties agree to 
“one or both of the following means of dispute settlement: i) 
submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice”; 
or, ii) arbitration constituted under the Aarhus Convention’s 
rules of procedure.137 
 
 134. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63. 
 135. Id. art. 16. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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To recall, by signing and ratifying the Aarhus Convention, 
the European Community agreed to be subject to its terms, which 
included provisions for dispute settlement.138  “In accordance 
with the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in 
particular Article 175(1) thereof, the European Community is 
competent for entering into international agreements, and for 
implementing the obligations resulting therefrom.”139  The 
Aarhus Convention is therefore part of EU law and binding on 
the European Community, its institutions that fall within the 
competence of the Convention, and its Member States.140 
There is recent case law on this interpretation.  In Stichting 
Natuur en Milieu & Pesticide Action Network Europe v. European 
Commission (2012) and Vereniging Milieudefensie & Stichting 
Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v. European Commission 
(2012), the European Court of Justice found that “the Aarhus 
Convention was signed by the European Community and 
subsequently approved by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 
February 2005 (OJ 2005 L 124, p. 1). The institutions are 
accordingly bound by that convention, which prevails over 
secondary Community legislation.”141 
By extension, the three pillars of the Aarhus Convention—
the right to information, public participation, and access to 
justice—are also binding.142  The Aarhus Convention has a 
different place in EU law than regulations and directives.  The 
 
 138. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63; see also Aarhus: What is the EU 
Doing?, EUR. ENVTL. BUREAU, http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/activities/governan 
ce-tools/aarhus/aarhus-what-is-the-eu-doing/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). The 
European Community signed the Aarhus Convention on June. 25, 1998 and 
ratified it on Feb. 17, 2005. Id. 
 139. The Decision on conclusion of the Aarhus Convention was adopted by the 
EC on February 17, 2005. Council Decision 2005/370, 2005 O.J. (L 124) 1 (EC); 
see also Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 2(2)(d). 
 140. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 216(2), Mar. 
25, 1957, 2010 O.J. 53, 83. 
 141. Case T-338/08, Stichting Natuur en Milieu & Pesticide Action Network 
Europe v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R.  at para. 52; Case T-396/09, Vereniging 
Milieudefensie & Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v. Comm’n, 2012 
E.C.R. II-00246, at para. 52. 
 142. See Case C-239/03, Comm’n v. France, 2004 E.C.R. I-09325 
(demonstrating where the provisions of a Convention and Protocol concluded by 
the EU created rights and obligations on Member States). 
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Convention trumps regulations and directives.  “It follows that 
the validity of a measure of secondary Community legislation 
may be affected by the fact that it is incompatible with the 
Aarhus Convention.”143 
(Regulations and directives are binding sources of secondary 
legislation.144  Regulations are directly applicable and binding in 
their entirety.145  Member States have a degree of flexibility as to 
the choice and form of transposing directives and directives are 
applicable as to the result to be achieved).146 
EU law—primary legislation, secondary legislation, and case 
law—thereby needs to be interpreted in the light of the Aarhus 
Convention.  The decisions are consistent with earlier findings.  
In consideration of environmental directives, the European Court 
of Justice found in Commission v. Ireland that, by merely 
publishing the procedures on the internet, Ireland had not 
fulfilled its obligations to inform the public in a sufficiently clear 
and precise manner about access to judicial review procedures in 
environmental matters.147 
If there is a contradiction in the interpretation of laws 
between national laws and the Aarhus Convention, then the 
Aarhus Convention prevails.148  If there is contradiction between 
EU law, such as the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Aarhus 
Convention, then there may be normative invalidity but this is 
unlikely.  A solution ought to be found that is compatible with 
both conventions.  For clarity, subject to ubiquitous provisions of 
general international law, e.g. good faith, the general provisions 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
 
 143. Case T-396/09, Vereniging Milieudefensie & Stichting Stop 
Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R. at para. 52. 
 144. Decision-Making in the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa 
.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-making/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 
1, 2012). 
 145. Regulations, Directives, and Other Acts, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa 
.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-making/legal-acts/index_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Case C-427/07, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2009 E.C.R. I-6277. 
 148. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 19(4). 
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and Fundamental Freedoms may be interpreted according to the 
more specific provisions provided for by the Aarhus Convention. 
If the contracting party to the Aarhus Convention is not a 
member of the EU, then the provisions of Article 16 of the Aarhus 
Convention will still provide for the settlement of disputes 
between the parties thereto.149  The UNECE website provides 
further details of relevant jurisprudence in its database on 
Aarhus Judgments.150  Jurisprudence of the European Court on 
Human Rights provides some useful guidance and the Article 
refers to a number of relevant cases in the analysis that follows. 
In Öneryıldız v. Turkey, the European Court of Human 
Rights rightly isolated consideration of the right to information to 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. (Turkey was not a member to the Aarhus Convention 
at that time).151  Öneryıldız disputed the question of 
responsibility for harm arising from a methane explosion.  Thirty-
nine people died when refuse engulfed inhabitants living in a 
Turkish slum on the edge of a rubbish tip following the 
explosion.152 
In reference to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, the Court found a violation of the 
right to life (enshrined in Article 2), a violation of the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions (Article 1 of Protocol number 
1), and a violation of a right to a domestic remedy (Article 13).153  
Having regard to these findings, the Court did not consider it 
necessary to examine the allegations of a violation of the right to 
a fair trial (Article 6, section 1) or the right to respect for private 
and family life (Article 8).  The Grand Chamber of the Court 
agreed that the right to information had already been recognized 
 
 149. Id. art. 16(1). 
 150. U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., http://www.unece.org (last visited Feb. 14, 
2012). 
 151. Georges-Stavros Kremlis, The Aarhus Convention and Its Implementation 
in the European Community, in SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 141 (Jo Gerardu at al. eds., 
2005), available at http://inece.org/conference/7/vol1/22_Kremlis.pdf. 
 152. Öneryıldız v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20, 34 (2005). 
 153. Id. at 80. 
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under Article 2 and, in principle, may be relied on for the 
protection of the right to life.154 
Roche v. United Kingdom (a case of October 19, 2005) 
considered the claim of another serviceman who incurred health 
injuries arising from weapons’ testing.155  This time around, 
servicemen participating in the United Kingdom’s testing of 
chemical weapons allegedly sustained injuries from notorious 
mustard nerve gas tests.156  The United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland signed the Aarhus Convention on 
June 25, 1998 and, according to the U.N. Treaty Collection, 
ratified it on February 23, 2005.157  At the time of the case the 
U.K. was therefore a member of the EU and a party to the 
Aarhus Convention. 
Analogous to what happened in McGinley, the U.K. 
government had refused to provide the injured applicants with a 
service pension.158  Again, the European Court of Human Rights 
linked the right to information to Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; but 
not to Article 10 or the lex specialis Aarhus regime.159  The 
judgment in McGinley states the Court considered that the 
United Kingdom had not fulfilled its positive obligation to provide 
an effective and accessible procedure enabling the applicant to 
have access to all relevant and appropriate information, which 
would allow him to assess any risk to which he had been exposed 
during his participation in the tests.  There had therefore been a 
violation of Article 8.160 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Roche v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32555/96, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 30, 33 
(2006). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, at 447; see also Archive: Aarhus 
Convention on Environmental Diplomacy, DEP’T FOR ENV’T FOOD & RURAL 
AFFAIRS, http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/policy/international/aarhus/ 
index.htm (last updated Nov. 26, 2009). 
 158. Roche v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32555/96, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 30, 38 
(2006). 
 159. Id. at 82. 
 160. McGinley & Egan v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 7-12 (1999). 
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In the Court’s view Article 10 was a de jure right but could 
not impose a positive obligation on the state to disseminate 
information (donner et retenir ne vaut).161  There had been no 
interference with the applicant’s right to information as provided 
for by virtue of Article 10.162  There was therefore no 
consideration of the Aarhus Convention although it was a highly 
relevant instrument of EU law.  Another perspective is that the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms was sufficient to establish the finding. 
In a more recent case, Tatar v. Romania aired a dispute 
relating to pollution and public health hazards resulting from the 
release of toxic sodium cyanide as part of a gold extraction 
process.163  Romania entered the EU in 2007 but it had 
independently signed the Aarhus Convention on June 25, 1998 
and ratified it on July 11, 2000.164  Romania ratified the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms in 1994.165 
The Court opined in Tatar v. Romania that public authorities 
had to ensure public access to environmental investigations and 
impact assessment studies.166  The Romanian Government 
continued to refrain from providing information even after an 
accident in 2000 resulted in the release of large quantities of 
cyanide into the environment.167  Industrial operations continued 
in violation of the precautionary principle.168  Still, the European 
Court of Human Rights held that the violation of the right to 
information did not encapsulate an Article 10 violation.169  
 
 161. Roche, App. No. 32555/96, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 79. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Tatar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01, 115 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009). 
 164. Romania, PUB. PARTICIPATION CAMPAIGN, http://www.participate.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=134:romania&catid=51:countr
ies&Itemid=121 (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
 165. Romania: Treaties Signed and Ratified Or having been the Subject of an 
Accession as of 18/11/2012, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?PO=ROM&MA=999&SI=2&DF=&CM=3&CL
=ENG (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
 166. Tatar, App. No. 67021/01, 115 Eur. Ct. H.R at 11. 
 167. Id. at 2. 
 168. Id. at 4. 
 169. Id. at 7. 
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Instead, the breach of a right to information was embodied in an 
Article 8 violation.  Respect for a person’s private and family life 
was paramount.170 
If Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms encapsulates a right to information, 
exactly when and where do Article 10 violations occur; or, are 
Article 10 rights given with one hand and taken away with the 
other (donner et retenir ne vaut)?  Violations of Article 10 often 
seem restricted to striking a balance between non-state actors, 
such as journalists and authors,171 rights of expression vis-a-vis 
crossing a threshold into defamation or libel.172  Sample cases 
include regulating the choice of the medium for expression, e.g. 
broadcasting173 and the expression of political views.174  These 
applications differ to extending Article 10 to the duties and 
responsibilities of public authorities to receive and impart 
information. 
Europe’s tendency to shy away from a fundamental right to 
information that incorporates positive obligations on public 
authorities is not necessarily encountered elsewhere.  The Inter-
American case of Claude Reyes & Others v. Chile illustrates an 
alternative approach.175  In 2006, the Inter-American Court of 
 
 170. Id. at 19. 
 171. Editions Plon v. France, App. No. 58148/00, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2006) 
(explaining that in Kenedi v. Hungary, the Court did find a violation of art. 10 
(freedom of expression) when a historian was refused access to documents 
concerning Hungary’s communist epoch); Fressoz & Roire v. France, App. No. 
29183/95, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2001); Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, 19 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1995) (violation of journalists’ and author’s freedom of 
expression). 
 172. Gorelishvili v. Georgia, App. No. 12979/04, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2009); 
Lopes Gomes Da Silva v. Portugal, App. No. 37698/97, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56 
(2002) (libel); Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 1377/88, 14 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 843 (1992); Lingens v. Austria, App, No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407 
(1986). 
 173. See Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia, App. No. 32283/04, 49 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 40 (2009) (refusal of a broadcasting license). 
 174. See Vajnai v. Hungary, App. No. 33629/06, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 44 (2010) 
(breach of political expression); Women on Waves & Others v. Portugal, App. No. 
31276/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Vogt v. Germany, App. No. 17851/91, 21 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 205 (1996). 
 175. Claude-Reyes v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151 (Sept. 19, 
2006). 
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Human Rights presided over Chile’s refusal to provide 
information on a deforestation project.176  The investment project 
was controversial due to its potential environmental impact.177  
There was no justification for the refusal and no access to an 
effective remedy.178 
Article 13 of the 1969 American Convention on Human 
Rights is similar to Article 10 of the 1950 European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
insofar that it incorporates the right to information within 
provisions for the Freedom of Thought and Expression.179  In 
Claude-Reyes, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
established that an Article 13 right to freedom of thought and 
expression includes the right to seek, receive, and impart 
information.180  Article 13 of the 1969 American Convention on 
Human Rights “protects the right of the individual to receive such 
information and the positive obligation of the State to provide 
it.”181 
These rights exist without any need for an applicant to prove 
a direct interest or personal involvement.  Exceptions are of 
course permitted where there is a legitimate restriction, for 
example, in situations that are necessary and satisfy a compelling 
public interest.182  The need to respect the rights or reputations of 
others or the protection of national security, public order, public 
health, or morals would fall under this category.183  States have a 
general obligation to adopt domestic legal provisions that give 
effect to the right to information.184  Similar lines of argument 
could also apply to protect the rights of future generations to an 
effective remedy. 
 
 176. Id. at 2. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 3. 
 179. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123. 
 180. Claude-Reyes, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, at 41. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 46. 
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Way before Europe has given effect to the Aarhus 
Convention’s provisions to reconcile the rights to environmental 
information with corresponding obligations, or those embodied in 
Article 10 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has elevated the right to information to a 
discrete fundamental human right complete with attendant 
obligations.  For parties to the American Convention on Human 
Rights, 1969, the right to information embodies both proactive 
(anticipatory) and reactive (responsive) obligations.  The Aarhus 
Convention may present the most impressive substantive 
embellishment of the potential to fulfill equity, but elaboration of 
an ideal is not the same as adherence thereto (donner et retenir ne 
vaut). 
While the aforementioned cases contrast geographical 
differences and priorities in terms of a human rights approach to 
environmental information, jurisprudence stemming from issue 
based sectoral treaties also provide a degree of sagacity on the 
subject.  The 2003 Ireland v. United Kingdom of Great Britain & 
Northern Ireland dispute,185 concerning access to information 
under Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention),186 
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, is emblematic.  (The 
dispute concerned “access to information” as defined by the 1992 
OSPAR Convention).187 
The OSPAR Convention establishes a framework that 
obligates the Contracting Parties “to prevent and eliminate 
pollution and to take the necessary measures to protect the 
maritime area against the adverse effects of human activities so 
as to safeguard human health and to conserve marine ecosystems 
and, when practicable, restore marine areas which have been 
 
 185. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR 
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59 (2003). 
 186. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter OSPAR 
Convention]. 
 187. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR 
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59 (2003). 
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adversely affected.”188  Article 1(a) of the Convention defines 
“maritime area” as “the internal waters and the territorial seas of 
the Contracting Parties, the sea beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea under the jurisdiction of the coastal state to the 
extent recognized by international law, and the high seas, 
including the bed of all those waters and its sub-soil,” situated 
within specified limits of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans and their 
dependent seas.189  Article 9 of the Convention provides for 
“access to information.”190 
Relying on its construction of Article 9(2) of the OSPAR 
Convention, Ireland sought information about a Mixed Oxide 
(MOX) Plant at Sellafield in the U.K.191  (Mixed oxide fuel is 
nuclear fuel produced from reprocessed plutonium and 
uranium).192  The U.K. argued that the information was 
commercially sensitive and mooted for derogation on the basis of 
commercial confidentiality as provided for by Article 9(3) of the 
Convention.193 
The dispute concerned three main provisions of the OSPAR 
Convention.194  Article 9(1) of the OSPAR Convention requires 
the Contracting Party’s competent authorities to respond to 
reasonable information requests.195  Article 9(2) defines the 
relevant information as “any available information in written, 
visual, aural or data-base form on the state of the maritime area, 
on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect it 
and on activities or measures introduced in accordance with the 
Convention.”196  Article 9(3) provides for certain exceptions, for 
 
 188. OSPAR Convention, supra note 186, art. 2(1)(a). 
 189. Id. art. 1(a). 
 190. Id. art. 9. 
 191. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR 
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59, 64 (2003). 
 192. Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf29.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 193. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR 
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59, 80 (2003). 
 194. Id. at 81. 
 195. OSPAR Convention, supra note 186, art. 9(1). 
 196. Id. art. 9(2). 
41
  
2012] RIGHT TO KNOW AND DUTY TO DISCLOSE 181 
 
example, that of “commercial and industrial confidentiality, 
including intellectual property.”197 
The Tribunal determined that Article 9(1) required an 
“outcome of result, namely information falling within the 
meaning of Article 9(2).”198  Under investigation, Ireland’s 
request for information set out an inventory of commercial 
requests, including sales, prices, and the number of employees.  
In turning to whether information requests with respect to the 
commissioning and operation of the MOX Plant at Sellafield are 
“relevant information requests,” the Tribunal opined that Ireland 
had failed to demonstrate that the information was “on the state 
of the maritime area,”  or that it “was likely to adversely affect 
the maritime area.”199  As the information requested did not fall 
under the OSPAR Convention, there was no need to ascertain 
whether the U.K. could avail itself of an Article 9(3) exception. 
Of note was that Ireland and the U.K. were both parties to 
the OSPAR Convention, but had not ratified the Aarhus 
Convention at the time of arbitration.  Ireland signed the Aarhus 
Convention on June 25, 1998, but had not ratified it by the time 
of arbitration.200  (According to the U.N. Treaty register, Ireland 
ratified the Aarhus Convention on June 20, 2012).201  The U.K. 
signed the Aarhus Convention on June 25, 1998 and ratified it on 
February 23, 2005.202  Furthermore, at the time of the arbitration 
there was no EC directive in effect that adopted Aarhus 
provisions. 
As signatories to the Aarhus Convention, one could argue 
that Ireland and the U.K. were demonstrating their intent to be 
bound.  Intent must therefore have some weight.  An interesting 
question arises as to what signifies intent.  Issues concerning 
treaty signature and putting initials to a treaty or suggesting 
 
 197. Id. art. 9(3). 
 198. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR 
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59, 101 (2003). 
 199. Id. at 111. 
 200. Ireland Ratifies the Aarhus Convention, U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR. 
(Sept. 9, 2001), http://aarhusclearinghouse.unece.org/news/1000432/. 
 201. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, at 447. 
 202. Id. 
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that a treaty has “legal force” in the absence thereof are 
sometimes less evident. 
Situations such as those where ACP countries (countries of 
Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific) put initials to, rather than 
signed, the ACP-EC Economic Partnership Agreements (EcPAs) 
are illustrative.  Article 10(b) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties provides that in the failure of another agreement 
that the “signature, signature ad referendum or initialing” of the 
treaty “by the representatives of those states of the text of the 
treaty or of the Final Act of a conference incorporating the text” 
establishes the text of the treaty as authentic and definitive, 
which may infer that it provides an understanding.203  In certain 
circumstances, the object and purpose of that understanding is 
not to be defeated.  By virtue of Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
[a] state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty 
or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to 
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its 
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has 
expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the 
entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into 
force is not unduly delayed.204 
A state may therefore enter into an obligation not to defeat a 
treaty’s object and purpose on initialing a treaty and before it 
enters into force. 
Article 18(a) is not limited to signature.205  If state parties 
exchange instruments establishing the text of a treaty as 
authentic and definitive subject to approval, then the state 
parties are obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the 
object and purpose of the treaty until they have made their 
 
 203. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 10(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 204. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 205. For an alternative view, see Lorand Bartels, The Legal Status of the 
Initialed EPAs and Legal Constraints on Renegotiation, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
INSIGHTS, Apr. 2008, available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/10682/. 
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intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.206  Good faith 
is paramount in international relations.  Good faith is a 
universally recognized principle of general international law.  It 
also has significance within World Trade Organization (WTO) 
law.207  In the absence of meeting strict criteria, one could also 
ask whether discrimination against other developing countries is 
an act of good faith. 
Parties initialing regional treaties that are already Members 
of the WTO have a concomitant obligation not to defeat the object 
and purpose of WTO treaty law.  For these parties, one may ask 
whether a party initialed a treaty with the view to rely on the 
good faith of the other to continue to inject influxes of aid for 
trade and other derogated preferences.  If this line of argument is 
followed then either initialing the EcPAs signified the parties’ 
intended to be bound and, in return, they could receive special 
favors; or the parties did not intend to be bound and they ought to 
refrain from undue delay tactics and forfeit special preferences 
that discriminate against others. 
Putting an initial to the EcPAs could still constitute a 
signature if it is established that the negotiating states so 
agreed.208  Within this regard, a thorough review of the 
preparatory works would be relevant before any legal opinion 
could ascertain whether there was consent to be bound by an 
“initial” that signified “signature.”  Other decisions have 
subsequently influenced the EcPA process.209  The point to be 
made in terms of the OSPAR case, and even in terms of future 
climate accords, is that the OSPAR case invoked no such 
consideration.210  Moreover, it would be a dangerous precedent to 
 
 206. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 207. Andrew. D. Mitchell, Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, 7 MELB. J. 
INT’L L. 339, n.2 (2006). 
 208. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 12(2)(a), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 209. Sandra Bartelt, ACP-EU Development Cooperation at a Crossroads? One 
Year after the Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement, 17 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. 
REV. 1, n.1 (2012). 
 210. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR 
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59 (2003). 
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usurp the recognized process of negotiation-signature-ratification 
without some just reason. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has considered 
similar issues although not on the same scale.  The dictum in the 
merits of the ICJ case Qatar v. Bahrain (judgment of March 16, 
2001) observed that there might be some evidentiary value in 
treaties signed but not ratified.211  As background, the Anglo-
Ottoman “Convention relating to the Persian Gulf and 
surrounding territories” was signed on July 29, 1913, but was 
never ratified.212  Qatar contended that non-ratification was 
largely attributable to the outbreak of the first World War, but it 
also pointed to a treaty ratified in 1914 that contained the same 
intent as the 1913 Convention.213  Bahrain argued from two main 
perspectives.  First, Bahrain contended that non-ratification was 
due to “the complex set of interdependent proposals [that] . . . 
ultimately fell apart.”214  Second, Bahrain observed that the text 
of the 1913 and 1914 treaties did not coincide.215 
In terms of the ICJ’s findings, 
[t]he Court observes that signed but unratified treaties may 
constitute an accurate expression of the understanding of the 
parties at the time of signature.  In the circumstances of this case 
the Court has come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention does represent evidence of the views of Great Britain 
and the Ottoman Empire as to the factual extent of the authority 
of the Al-Thani Ruler in Qatar up to 1913.216 
What happened after signature, however, is something 
completely different. 
Whether it could be argued that consideration to be bound 
possesses evidentiary value of a binding nature needs further 
reflection, particularly if the Aarhus Convention may contribute 
in the future to the universal constitutionalism of international 
 
 211. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain.), 2001 I.C.J. 40 (Mar. 16). 
 212. Id. ¶ 45. 
 213. Id. ¶ 46. 
 214. Id. ¶ 47. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. ¶ 89. 
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law.  The term “consideration” is an interesting one, particularly 
in terms of governing the international climate regime. 
To proceed, the Article will address the following types of 
questions.  Is it possible to distinguish between different types of 
consideration in international treaty law?  Could one type of 
consideration be that of “democratic consideration,” say that of 
due parliamentary process within a dualist system?  
Alternatively, in the absence of such consideration, could some 
other type of consideration prevail, such as that of a monetary or 
economic nature?  Within the domain of lex specialis regimes in 
particular, can exchanges of an economic nature, or equivalent 
thereof, be constructed as legally binding promises to comply with 
that which goes beyond a cruder intent to rally the troops? 
Returning to the OSPAR dispute with these issues in mind, 
the tribunal decided not to take the European Council’s Directive 
2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information into 
account.217  Directive 2003/4/EC entered into force on February 
14, 2003, with transposition by member states due by February 
14, 2005 at the latest.218  It is thereby rather stretching the point 
to try to argue that all public authorities in the U.K. were bound 
prior to the due implementation date and when the U.K.’s 
ratification of the Aarhus Convention did not take place until 
February 23, 2005, which was after the dispute.219 
The next question to ask is what would have been the finding 
if the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC on public 
access to environmental information were applicable and within 
the competence of the dispute settlement body?  For that is surely 
a most interesting question in the view of future challenges to 
developing universal and effective rights to information in the 
global commons. 
The process of analysis pursued by the arbitral tribunal in 
the OSPAR dispute is an apt example to employ in the ensuing 
analysis.  To do so, the analysis embraces three questions 
systematically.  First, how do the Aarhus Convention and 
 
 217. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, 2003 O.J. 
(L 41) 26-32. 
 218. Id. art. 12. 
 219. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63. 
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Directive 2003/4/EC define environmental information?  Second, 
does the data on the commissioning and operations of a nuclear 
fuel plant, like that requested by Ireland, fall into this all-
inclusive definition as provided for by the Aarhus Convention and 
Directive 2003/4/EC; or, is the data too far removed from the 
definition of “environmental information”?  Third, if commercial 
data could be interpreted as a type of environmental information, 
is there any derogation to which the U.K. could avail itself to 
protect commercial data? 
The first task is to reach agreement on the terms.  
Comparing the meaning of environmental information as 
provided for by the Aarhus Convention with that provided for by 
Directive 2003/4/EC is useful in this regard.  Environmental 
information under the Aarhus Convention and Directive 
2003/4/EC includes any information in written, visual, aural, 
electronic, or any other material form on the state of the elements 
of the environment.220  To this definition, Directive 2003/4/EC 
specifies reports on the implementation of environmental 
legislation.221  Environmental information must concern the 
elements of the environment, the “state” thereof, and be in a 
material form.222 
Under both instruments, “elements of the environment” 
include air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape, and 
natural sites, biological diversity and its components, including 
genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these 
elements.223  For Directive 2003/4/EC, landscape and natural 
sites extends to include wetlands, coastal, and marine areas.224  
The relevant information must pertain to these elements and, in 
addition, to the “state” thereof.225  The “state” of the elements of 
the environment may be interpreted to mean their environmental 
condition, environmental predicament, administrative form, 
 
 220. Id. art. 2(3). 
 221. Id. art. 2(1). 
 222. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, para. 10, 
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26. 
 223. Id. art. 2(1)(a); Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 2(3)(a). 
 224. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, art. 2(1)(a), 
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26.  Coastal and marine areas are elements of specific relevance 
to the OSPAR regulatory framework. 
 225. Id. 
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quantitative structure, or application in environmental decision-
making.226 
The definition of environmental information goes further to 
itemize “factors” affecting or likely to affect the specified elements 
of the environment.  These factors may predicate the condition or 
the predicament of the environment.  Such factors include, but 
are not necessarily limited to, energy, noise, and radiation likely 
to affect the elements of the environment.227  (Directive 
2003/4/EC also includes waste, radioactive waste, emissions, 
discharges, and other releases into the environment).228 
In terms of the Aarhus Convention, factors include activities 
of measures, including administrative measures, environmental 
agreements, policies, legislation, plans and programs, affecting or 
likely to affect the specified elements of the environment, and 
cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used 
in environmental decision-making.229  Activities and measures 
may predicate the form and subject matter of environmental 
information.  For example, Directive 2003/4/EC specifies 
“measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, 
legislation, plans, programs, environmental agreements, and 
activities affecting or likely to affect the elements” and factors, 
separately, as well as measures or activities designed to protect 
those elements.230 
Like the Aarhus Convention, environmental information as 
defined in Directive 2003/4/EC includes cost-benefit and other 
economic analyses and assumptions used within the framework of 
the specified measures and activities.231  Prima facie, cost-benefit 
and economic analyses is limited to that likely to affect 
environmental elements and other factors, but it is inclusive of 
both qualitative and quantitative data.  For both instruments, 
environmental information includes information on the state of 
human health and safety, human life, cultural sites, and built 
 
 226. Id. para. 10. 
 227. Id. art. 2(1)(b). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 2(3)(b). 
 230. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, art. 2(1)(c), 
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26. 
 231. Id. art. 2(1)(e). 
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structures insofar as they are or may be affected by the state of 
the elements of the environment or through these elements by 
the factors, activities, or measures.232  (Directive 2003/4/EC 
extends health and safety to include the contamination of the food 
chain).233 
To all appearances, while there are some differences between 
the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC, the meaning of 
environmental information as defined in both instruments is 
intrinsically linked to the form of conveying information, the 
subject matter of the information and factors affecting, or likely 
to affect, that subject matter.  As a directive, however, Directive 
2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information is 
binding on member states as to the result to be achieved.234  
Discretion lies with national authorities as to the choice of form 
and method of implementation.235  However, Directive 2003/4/EC 
on public access to environmental information also makes it clear 
that “provisions of Community law must be consistent with the 
Aarhus Convention.”236  European Human Rights law is a 
fundamental component of Community law and its interpretation 
and application must be consistent with the Aarhus Convention 
and vice-versa. 
Seemingly, cost-benefit and other economic analyses and 
assumptions used in environmental decision-making may be 
considered environmental information, but only if their object and 
purpose is to determine the state of the elements of the 
environment.  It is not therefore possible to define commercial 
data and economic analysis of any sort as simply environmental 
information within the construction of the Aarhus Convention 
and Directive 2003/4/EC. 
Even if the first hurdle is passed and the commercial data in 
question is considered to be within the definition of 
 
 232. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 2(3)(c); Directive of the European 
Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, para. 10, 2003 O.J. (L 41) 26. 
 233. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, para. 10, 
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26. 
 234. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 288, Mar. 30, 2010, O.J. (C 83) 47. 
 235. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, art. 10, 
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26. 
 236. Id. para. 5. 
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environmental information, the Aarhus Convention and Directive 
2003/4/EC provide for a number of other safeguards.237  These 
safeguards are formulated as exceptions to the rule.  Directive 
2003/4/EC specifies: 
Member States may provide for a request for environmental 
information to be refused if disclosure of the information would 
adversely affect: [inter alia] (d) the confidentiality of commercial 
or industrial information where such confidentiality is provided 
for by national or Community law to protect a legitimate 
economic interest, including the public interest in maintaining 
statistical confidentiality and tax secrecy.238 
The country concerned could of course claim an adverse effect 
on public security or national defense, but there must be some 
justification to this claim.239  Even if the Aarhus Convention fell 
within the domains of applicable law in the OSPAR dispute, the 
Convention itself provides for similar safeguards that aim to 
uphold the integrity of national sovereignty. 
In another dispute, one on the admissibility of Sdruzení 
Jihoceské Matky v. Czech Republic,240 the European Court of 
Human Rights considered the request by a non-governmental 
organization for information pertaining to a nuclear power 
station under the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  The genesis of the 
dispute evolved from the construction of a soviet engineered 
nuclear power station at Temelín as authorized by the ancient 
regime of Czechoslovakia.  After the change in regime in 1989, it 
was decided to complete construction of the plant with the aid of 
American technology.  Residents living within the proximity of 
Temelín founded a NGO (Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky of České 
Budejovice).  Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky (South Bohemian 
Mothers) is a voluntary, independent, non-political, 
environmental organization with the primary mission of 
 
 237. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 4(3)-(4); see Directive of the 
European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, art. 4(2), 2003 O.J. (L 41) 26. 
 238. Id. art. 4(2)(d). 
 239. Id. art. 4(2)(b). 
 240. Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky v. Czech Republic, App. No. 19101/03, 2006 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1205. 
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protecting nature and landscape.241  Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky, 
the applicant, sought information regarding the construction of 
the plant and condemned the omission of an Environmental 
Impact Assessment and the failure to be properly notified. 
The applicant invoked Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and claimed a 
breach of freedom to receive information needed for the NGO’s 
activities.242  The Court’s deliberations reopened the debate on 
Article 10 of the Convention.  It recalled that Article 10 section 2 
of the Convention “concerns before all else, the access to general 
sources of information and aims essentially to prohibit a State 
from refusing access to information.”243  The Court “observed 
equally that it is difficult to deduct that the Convention conveys a 
right of general access to data and documents of an 
administrative character.”244  And the Court observed that “the 
present case concerns the access to information relative to a 
central nuclear station, which is an installation of grand 
complexity exigent a very high level of security.”245 The Court 
therefore considered that Article 10 does not give an absolute 
right to access all technical details relative to the construction of 
a central nuclear plant. 
In contrast to environmental impact information, it is not in 
the general interest to disseminate this type of technical 
information.  “When the law to exercise the right to receive 
information can impair the rights of others, public safety or 
public health, the extent of the right to access information in 
cause is limited by Article 10(2) of the Convention.”246  
 
 241. History of the Association, S. BOHEMIAN MOTHERS CIVIC ASS’N,  http://tra 
nslate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=cs&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jihoc
eskematky.cz%2F%3Fcl%3D1 (last visited Dec. 8, 2012). 
 242. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 36, art. 10(1) (providing for Freedom of 
Expression, which also includes, in its first clause, a right to the “freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”). 
 243. Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky v. Czech Republic, App. No. 19101/03, 2006 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 9. 
 244. Id. at 10. 
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. at 11. 
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Regardless of the importance of a right to information, a 
government’s right to protect industrial secrets, manage the risk 
of potential terrorism, and protect the health and well-being of its 
citizens is paramount. 
In the circumstances of the Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky (South 
Bohemian Mothers) dispute, and taking into account the margin 
of appreciation left to states, an intervention in the application of 
Article 10 to receive information is not disproportionate to certain 
national objectives to be pursued. The grievance was thereby 
rejected for manifest default of substance. 
Of interest to this paper is that the Court directed its 
analysis from an Article 10, right to information, provision.  
While the Court strengthened the application of Article 10, the 
right to information is still subject to national public interest.  As 
stipulated in Article 10, section 2: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.247 
It should of course be pointed out that European Union 
member states are also state parties to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and thereby agreed by 
virtue of Article 19, section 3, that the exercise of the right to 
seek, receive, and impart information 
. . . carries with it special duties and responsibilities.  It may 
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be 
such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of 
the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of 
 
 247. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 36, art. 10(2). 
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national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals.248 
Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky’s application was not deemed 
inadmissible because Article 10 was not applicable.249  Imparting 
such sensitive information could have been contrary to the 
national interest. 
In the future, it is likely that many more disputes will 
leverage the Aarhus Convention to moot for the right to 
environmental information.  As in Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky and 
by virtue of the Aarhus Convention and its implementing 
directives, such information must be subject to certain limits.  
According to the Aarhus Convention, public authorities are under 
an obligation to respond to requests for information and to take 
reasonable steps to prevent harm to human life or the 
environment.250  There is a duty to inform, but that duty should 
not be disciplined by restricting proactive and reactive obligations 
encapsulated by the Aarhus Convention (donner et retenir ne 
vaut).  Instead, the duty to inform ought to be disciplined by the 
integrity of the national courts in matters such as national 
security, public safety, and public health.  International law will 
still have a defining role, especially when the information desired 
resides or relates to the law of the global commons. 
It may still be left to the ICJ to “fill in the gaps.”  As observed 
by the ICJ in South West Africa, “[i]t may be urged that the 
Court is entitled to engage in a process of ‘filling in the gaps,’ in 
the application of a teleological principle of interpretation, 
according to which instruments must be given their maximum 
effect in order to ensure the achievement of their underlying 
purposes.”251  Likewise, in assessing the right to information in 
the climate change regime, or any other lex specialis regime, the 
right to information may be a fundamental right, but it is subject 
 
 248. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6, art. 
19(3). 
 249. Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky v. Czech Republic, App. No. 19101/03, 2006 
Eur. Ct. H.R 1205. 
 250. See generally Aarhus Convention, supra note 63. 
 251. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 91 
(July 18). 
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to condition and discipline by the framework within which it 
exists. 
II. THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND 
MUNICIPAL CLIMATE LAW AND THE RIGHT 
TO INFORMATION 
Part one explained the nexus between international human 
rights law, international environmental law, and the right to 
information.  The right to information also finds its relevancy and 
disciplines in international climate law.  Part two uses the 
framework of proactive (anticipatory) and reactive (responsive) 
obligations set out in part one to examine the right to information 
about climate change and the adverse effects of climate harm.  It 
does this in two main ways.  First, the study examines the right 
to information as it applies to the right to know at an 
international level.  Second, the analysis turns to the national 
level to examine the characteristics of the duty to disclose. 
A. International Climate Law and the Right to 
 Information 
The degree to which participants in the climate change 
regime use information, or omit information from use, influences 
the conduct of equity.  The formulation, implementation, and due 
process of subjective equity are issues of effect.  Giving effect to 
equity sometimes includes but is not limited to procedural equity.  
A “conduct norm” may also incorporate a substantive norm. 
Mitigating and adapting to extreme weather events, coping 
with climate stress, and learning how to deal with a public health 
crisis arising from climate injury demand timely and informed 
decision-making.  Decision-making is a process that should 
consider both the guarantee and fulfillment of equity.  An 
inclusive process will facilitate the participation of interested 
actors. 
Effective implementation of the climate change treaty 
regime—namely the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), decisions of the UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties (COP Decisions), and, for some, the 
54http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/4
  
194 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
Kyoto Protocol—requires relevant and timely information.252  
There is also a need to discipline the right to information.  The 
willingness to improve the quality of information, and the 
capacity of climate change actors to use that information to 
inform decision-making, should influence the evolution of future 
agreements to mitigate and adapt to climate harm. 
The UNFCCC treaty incorporates broad-reaching normative 
provisions of the right to information.253  This section will focus 
on the invocation of positive rights and proactive (anticipatory) 
and reactive (responsive) obligations.  It will highlight three main 
substantive provisions of the UNFCCC provided for by Articles 4, 
6, and 12 of the UNFCCC.254 
Article 4 of the UNFCCC includes both proactive obligations 
(anticipatory commitments to disseminate information) and 
reactive obligations (commitments to respond to information 
requests).255  Article 6 of the UNFCCC incorporates proactive 
obligations to educate, train, and raise public awareness.256  
Article 6(a), for instance, stipulates that “the Parties shall 
promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, sub 
regional and regional levels, and in accordance with national laws 
and regulations, and within their respective capacities: . . . public 
access to information on climate change and its effects.”257  Public 
access presumes the establishment of some response mechanism.  
In a sense, this provision informs a reactive obligation.  If not, the 
mechanism would be ineffective.  (Donner et retenir ne vaut).  By 
requiring all parties to communicate information on greenhouse 
gas emissions (GHG emissions) to the COP through the 
secretariat, Article 12 of the UNFCCC also blends international 
 
 252. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May, 9 1992, 
U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) [hereinafter U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change]; see Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/ [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. art. 4, 6, 12. 
 255. Id. art. 4. 
 256. Id. art. 6. 
 257. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 252, art. 
6(a). 
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and municipal obligations of a proactive (anticipatory) and 
reactive (responsive) nature.258 
Commitments under Article 4(1) of the UNFCCC oblige, 
either explicitly or indirectly, the formulation and publication of 
information in virtually every sub-clause.259  Article 4(1)(a) 
provides for information requests and publishing information 
concerning inventories of anthropogenic emissions.260  Article 
4(1)(b) provides for measures to mitigate climate change.261  
Article 4(1)(c) provides for information on technology transfer.262  
Article 4(1)(e) provides for adaptation plans for coastal zone 
management.263 Article 4(1)(f) provides for climate change 
national impact assessments.264  Article 4(1)(g) provides for the 
development of data archives.265  Article 4(1)(h) provides for the 
exchange of relevant scientific, technological, technical, socio-
economic, and legal information related to the climate system and 
climate change.266  Article 4(1)(i) provides for the promotion and 
cooperation in education, training, and public awareness related 
to climate change and encouraging the widest participation in 
this process, including that of NGOs.267  Article 4(1)(j) governs 
the communication of information concerning implementation in 
accord with Article 12.268 
Article 12 of the UNFCCC obliges the Parties to inform the 
COP of climate change data.  Communicating national 
inventories to the COP is mandatory.  Article 12(1)(a) stipulates: 
In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party shall 
communicate to the Conference of the Parties, through the 
secretariat, the following elements of information: 
 
 258. Id. art. 12. 
 259. Id. art. 4(1). 
 260. Id. art. 4(1)(a). 
 261. Id. art. 4(1)(b). 
 262. Id. art. 4(1)(c). 
 263. Id. art. 4(1)(e). 
 264. Id. art. 4(1)(f). 
 265. Id. art. 4(1)(g). 
 266. Id. art. 4(1)(h). 
 267. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 252, art. 
4(1)(i). 
 268. Id. art. 4(1)(j). 
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(a) A national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by 
the Montreal Protocol, to the extent its capacities permit, using 
comparable methodologies to be promoted and agreed upon by 
the Conference of the Parties.269 
Article 12 also obliges progress reports on implementing the 
Convention. 
Some UNFCCC Article 4 commitments reconcile positive 
(actionable) rights with reactive (responsive) obligations, such as 
handling information requests.  Other commitments reconcile 
positive (actionable) rights with proactive (anticipatory) 
obligations, such as promoting public awareness and 
communicating information regarding implementation. 
The UNFCCC also incorporates proactive obligations by 
virtue of Article 6 obligations.  Article 6 sets out obligations to 
educate, train, and raise public awareness as needed to fulfill 
Article 4 commitments.270  The scope of Article 6’s fairness 
provisions also extend to public access to information, public 
participation, and international cooperation.  In addition, Article 
6 commitments link to Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol, which 
provides obligations on all contracting Parties concerning 
international cooperation, implementation of education and 
training programs, capacity building, public awareness, and 
public access to information on climate change.271 
COP Decision 11/CP.8 (2002) adopted a five-year work 
program on Article 6 and encouraged Parties to make full use of 
the Global Environmental Facility to support implementation.272  
An intermediate review at COP 10 in Buenos Aires, 2004, (COP 
Decision 7/CP.10) further endorsed the New Delhi program and 
emphasized specific actions that the Parties could take, such as 
 
 269. Id. art. 12(1)(a). 
 270. Id. art. 6. 
 271. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 252, art. 10(e). 
 272. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New Delhi, 
India, Oct. 23-Nov. 1, 2002, Conference of the Parties Report of the Conference of 
the Parties on its Eighth Session, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken By the 
Conference of the Parties at its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.2 
(March 28, 2003), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop8/07a01.pdf 
[hereinafter UNFCCC, New Delhi]. 
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collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on climate 
change trends and increasing information exchange between 
states and non-state actors.273  Decision 9 of COP 13 (held in Bali 
in 2007) amended the New Delhi work program and extended it 
for another five years.274  In 2010, COP 16 (Conference of the 
Parties) / CMP 6 (Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) recognized the 
importance of giving effect to equity as a driver of 
implementation even further when it adopted the decision 
entitled “Progress in, and ways to enhance, the implementation of 
the amended New Delhi work program on Article 6 of the 
Convention.”275 
In addition, the UNFCCC’s COP Rules of Procedure, which 
govern participation, inherently contain provisions on the right to 
information.  Rule 7(1) of the UNFCCC’s COP Rules of Procedure, 
and those of its subsidiary bodies, permits “any governmental or 
nongovernmental, national or international, body or agency 
qualified in matters covered by the Convention and which has 
informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session 
of the Conference of the Parties as an observer may be so 
admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present at the 
session object.”276  Rule 7(2) provides that “such observers may, 
upon invitation of the President, participate without the right to 
vote in the proceedings of any session in matters of direct concern 
to the body or agency they represent, unless at least one third of 
 
 273. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Buenos 
Aires, Dec. 6-18, 2004, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Tenth 
Session, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at 
its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.1 (Apr. 19, 2005), available 
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop10/10a01.pdf. 
 274. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Dec. 3-
15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, 
Addendum, Reporting on Global Observing Systems for Climate, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6 (March 14, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
2007/cop13/eng/06a02.pdf. 
 275. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Progress In, 
and Ways to Enhance, the Implementation of the Amended New Delhi Work 
Programme on Article 6 of the Convention (2010), http://unfccc.int/ 
files/meetings/cop_16/conference_documents/application/pdf/20101204_cop16_c
mp_art6.pdf (last viewed Feb. 14, 2012). 
 276. Id. 
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the Parties present at the session object.”277  The UNFCCC 
Secretariat has also set out guidelines for participation, which 
incorporate the freedom of expression and the right to 
information.278 
Like the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol incorporates extensive 
provisions by which to govern the right to information.  To give 
an example, Article 2(1)(b) of the Kyoto Protocol provides for 
sharing of information on policies and measures to quantify 
emission limitation and reduction commitments to promote 
sustainable development.  Article 7 gives more precision to the 
submission of information, such as information to supplement 
annual GHG inventories (Article 7(1) Kyoto Protocol), 
information to demonstrate compliance (Article 7(2) Kyoto 
Protocol), and preparation of guidelines for the preparation of the 
required information (Article 7(4) Kyoto Protocol); whereas, 
Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for a review of Article 7’s 
informational requirements. 
While the UNFCCC treaty regime governing climate law 
provides for the right to information, a number of other 
conditions discipline that right.  Disclosure duties for developed 
versus developing countries differ.  Developed countries 
encounter far more rigorous informational obligations than 
developing countries.  Developed countries are to provide the 
COP with detailed descriptions of policies and plans that they 
have adopted with the view to implementing UNFCCC Article 4 
commitments. 
Besides the universal international treaty regime of the 
UNFCCC, which includes UNFCCC COP Decisions, other legal 
instruments also incorporate a right to climate change 
information.  Each party to the Aarhus Convention is obligated to 
promote education and awareness amongst the public on 
environmental information, which includes promoting 
information on the air and the atmosphere and, arguably, climate 
change.  Moreover, Article 7 paragraph 3 thereto provides that 
“[e]ach Party shall promote the application of the principles of 
 
 277. Id. 
 278. UNFCCC Secretariat, Guidelines for the Participation of Representatives 
of Non-Governmental Organizations at Meetings of the Bodies of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Mar. 2003). 
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this Convention in international environmental decision-making 
processes and within the framework of international 
organizations in matters relating to the environment.”279  Parties 
to the Aarhus Convention thereby endorse the application of the 
Aarhus provisions within the context of climate law. 
Despite the Aarhus Convention providing a regulatory 
framework for giving effect to equity, it remains surprising just 
how seldom parties refer to the Aarhus Convention in climate 
change negotiations.  As pointed out in a 2008 report published 
by the International Council on Human Rights entitled Climate 
Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide, “It is surprising, 
given the essential role that information and participation must 
play in developing adaptation policies, that Aarhus 3(7) appears 
not to have been invoked or insisted upon in those 
negotiations.”280 
The obligation to collate and disseminate “accurate” climate 
change information is a case in point.  As with the 
aforementioned illustrative cases covering international human 
rights law and environmental law, climate change cases raise 
significant concerns about the discipline of climate law. 
Svitlana Kravchenko’s study entitled Procedural Rights as a 
Crucial Tool to Combat Climate Change cites a good example in 
the Ukraine.  According to Kravchenko, 
the NGO coalition, Climate of the Future Without Danger for Life 
in Ukraine, knew before UNFCCC COP-14 in Poznan, that 
Ukraine’s commitment to reduce GHG emissions 20% by 2020 in 
reality meant an emissions increase by 70% due to economic 
decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The coalition tried 
to push the government to change its position and convey these 
revised statistics before COP-15 in Copenhagen.  When the NGO 
coalition failed to convince Ukraine’s government, it made a 
statement at COP-15 revealing the real situation.281 
 
 279. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 7(3). 
 280. THE INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A ROUGH GUIDE 50 (2008). 
 281. Svitlana Kravchenko, Procedural Rights as a Crucial Tool to Combat 
Climate Change, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 613, 623 (2010). 
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Questions have also arisen in the search for the whereabouts of 
some 320 million euros in carbon trading monies that Ukraine 
was thereby able to raise selling hot air credits under the 
international emissions trading mechanism.282 
Equally prevalent in climate law is a similar confusion 
relating to proactive (anticipatory) and reactive (responsive) 
obligations in international environmental law.  Responding to 
requests for information about climate change is one thing.  
Proactively collating, disseminating, and improving public 
awareness on the adverse effects of climate change is something 
altogether different. 
The UNFCCC establishes the legal architecture needed to 
discipline existing and future agreements.  It also includes 
guidelines for measurement, reporting, and verification, which 
are vital to discipline accountability, integrity, and temporality.  
Even so, going into Rio 20 and UNFCCC COP 18, the landscape 
was murky as to which groups require what sort of information 
and whether stakeholders have relevant and timely information 
in order to make informed decisions.  Using Rio 20, to consolidate 
the right to information and the duty to disclose would have been 
a step forward.  In the future, other opportunities will arise 
through the UNFCCC COP.  The parties could make progress by 
developing a cohesive architecture to benchmark monitoring, 
verification, and reporting internationally. 
A needs based approach could segment the stakeholders and 
their relevant issues concerning the right to information and then 
analyze each cluster independently.  Reference to the private 
sector provides an example.  What levels of disclosure do private 
sector organizations require?  Do all citizens need a 
comprehensive understanding of the technical scientific 
underpinnings of climate change?  Should the impetus be on 
supporting citizens to enhance energy efficient activities at home?  
What role should the climate change constituencies have in 
channeling information to the right sectors?  In terms of children 
and youth, for instance, should climate change information be 
 
 282. Ukraine’s AAU ‘Black Hole’, CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK INT’L (June 8, 
2010), http://www.climatenetwork.org/blog/ukraine%E2%80%99s-aau-%E2%80 
%A8%E2%80%98black-hole%E2%80%99. 
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integrated within school curriculums?  In terms of farmers, 
should support they receive for crop rotation also incorporate an 
informational campaign on the adverse effects of climate change?  
In terms of potential climate change refugees, or “climate 
migrant” in a preferred legal parlance, do they have a right to 
know and make informed decisions? 
The issue of displaced persons is another good example as to 
where progress could be made.  The African Union’s Convention 
for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons 
in Africa (Kampala Convention), adopted October 22, 2009 
(entered into force as of March 16, 2011),283 will perhaps be even 
more relevant albeit that the international treaty regime on 
refugee law has its gray areas and gaps in terms of climate 
change displacement.284  The Kampala Convention obligates the 
African Union to “share information with the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the situation of displacement, 
and the protection and assistance accorded to internally displaced 
persons in Africa,” including those displaced due to natural or 
human made disasters, amongst which climate change is 
specifically listed.285 
Article 10 of the Kampala Convention provides for 
“displacement induced by projects.”286  Article 10(2) provides that 
“States Parties shall ensure that the stakeholders concerned will 
explore feasible alternatives, with full information and 
consultation of persons likely to be displaced by projects.”287  As 
an example of a relevant issue, a question could arise as to 
whether bilateral investment treaties should also incorporate 
provisions for the right to climate change under investment 
promotion and protection.  These issues are of course 
 
 283. African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa, Oct. 22, 2009, 40 I.L.M 85 [hereinafter Kampala 
Convention] (the Kampala Convention shall enter into force thirty days after the 
deposit of the instruments of ratification or accession by fifteen Member States). 
 284. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan 
31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
 285. Kampala Convention, supra note 283, art. 8(3)(e). 
 286. Id. art. 10. 
 287. Id. art. 10(2). 
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controversial; but the task of policy makers and the international 
jurist is to solve problems not to avoid them. 
Universally and interoperability requires finding the right 
balance between a differential needs based approach, a common 
“peoples” rights based approach, and respective capabilities at all 
levels, the national level included.  Common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities derive from the legal 
principle of equity but have an intrinsic link to other 
fundamental principles of international climate law, such as the 
principle of sustainable development.  In accordance with Article 
3(4) of the UNFCCC, 
the Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable 
development.  Policies and measures to protect the climate 
system against human-induced change should be appropriate for 
the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated 
with national development programmes, taking into account that 
economic development is essential for adopting measures to 
address climate change.288 
The following section addresses the normative context of 
integration as a right to know and a duty to disclose. 
B. National Climate Law and the Right to Information 
1. A Right to Know. . . 
In parallel with advancing frameworks for the right to 
climate change information at the international level, endeavors 
to reinforce the right to information and improve the right to 
know and the duty to disclose must advance nationally.  
Comparisons of the right to climate change information in the 
four municipal jurisdictions of Germany, England, Wales, and the 
United States illustrate the practicalities.  First, reference to the 
Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland & Germanwatch 
v. Germany dispute will illustrate developments of the right to 
climate change information in Germany.  Second, analysis of the 
2007 “Inconvenient Truth” case will exhibit interpretation of the 
 
 288. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 252, art 
3(4). 
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right to climate change information by the courts of England and 
Wales.  Third, reflection on a series of interactions between 
federal and state law in the U.S. will demonstrate other pertinent 
issues. 
In turning to Germany, applicants in the administrative 
dispute Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland & 
Germanwatch v. Germany sought information on export credit 
guarantees, but the relevant ministry refused the request.289  
(Export credit guarantees provide financial support for climate 
change). Could the applicants invoke a reactive (responsive) 
obligation on the respondents to provide information? 
In dispute was whether the request for climate-related 
information constituted “environmental information.”290  Energy 
projects supported by export credits certainly affect 
environmental elements, such as the atmosphere.  
Notwithstanding, did the actual granting of export credits 
constitute environmental information? 
The German Access to Environmental Information Act 
(Umwelt Informations Gesetz or UIG) of December 22, 2004, as 
amended on February 14, 2005, was relevant. Section 3.1 of the 
UIG provides for the right of every person to have free access to 
environmental information held by or for public authorities.291  
The wording of section 3.1 is similar to like provisions of the 
Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC; and the UIG itself 
permits broad interpretation to give effect to European wide law. 
The primary purpose of Germany’s export credit support 
program was to aid Germany’s economy, but where an 
environmental impact assessment was required there was “an 
important secondary or intermediate purpose” to protect the 
environment.292  In citing the OECD, the court viewed that 
“granting or denying export credit support/guarantees will 
positively or negatively affect the implementation of a project and 
 
 289. Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Court Berlin] Jan. 10, 2006, 10 
A 215.04, translated in Unofficial Translation of the German Original (Climate 
Justice Programme, Feb 3, 2006), available at http://www.climatelaw.org 
/cases/country/germany/exportcredit/. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 5. 
 292. Id. at 7. 
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therewith will, with some probability, also affect the 
environment.”293 
The Ministry of Economics and Labor had already 
acknowledged that export credit supports considered 
environmental concerns.  The request for information on export 
credit supports was therefore, in the circumstances of the present 
case, environmental information.  Yet, could the government still 
request derogation? 
The government pleaded for compromise.  To be valid, such 
claims must reach a certain degree of “seriousness.”294  The 
request was not manifestly unreasonable.  It was not 
commercially sensitive to the extent that justified a waiver of the 
public interest.  The administrative order thereby required the 
government to disclose the relevant information requested, but in 
the interests of a fair and equitable compromise, not every tiny 
detail of that information required disclosure.295 
In England and Wales, the Stuart Dimmock v. Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills case, or “Inconvenient Truth” case, 
was overtly mediatized.  Like Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz 
Deutschland & Germanwatch v. Germany, the case involved 
administrative law.  The High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench 
Division of the Administrative Court, heard the case in 2007.296 
By way of background, Stuart Dimmock, the father of two 
sons at a state school and school governor, sought to revoke a 
decision, by the then Secretary of State for Education and Skills, 
to distribute a copy of former U.S. Vice-President Al Gore’s film, 
An Inconvenient Truth, to every state secondary school in 
England.297  An Inconvenient Truth (AIT) was part of a pack of 
short films supported by a guidance note.298  Dimmock mooted 
that climate change was a partisan political view and that the 
promulgation of a politically orientated film violated the law.299 
 
 293. Id. at 7-8. 
 294. Id. at 10. 
 295. Id. at 12. 
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 297. Id. ¶ 1. 
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Justice Burton considered the film political but not “party-
political.”300  For Burton the government “understandably formed 
the view that AIT was an outstanding film, [it had won an Oscar, 
was professionally produced, and persuasively argued] and that 
schools should be enabled to show it to pupils.”301  Simply 
facilitating the showing of the film, and issuing an accompanying 
guideline, was not in the court’s opinion “a promotion of partisan 
political views.”302 
Notwithstanding, the film contained a number of “alarmist” 
errors, which supported Al Gore’s political crusade.  Al Gore 
claimed that a “sea level rise of up to 20 feet (7 meters) will be 
caused by melting of either West Antarctica or Greenland in the 
near future.”303 “Think of the impact of a couple of hundred 
thousand refugees when they are displaced by an environmental 
event and then imagine the impact of a 100 million or more,” said 
Gore. 304  For Justice Burton, this claim was “distinctly alarmist, 
and part of Mr. Gore’s ‘wake-up call.’”  Justice Burton remarked: 
It is common ground that if indeed Greenland melted, it would 
release this amount of water, but only after, and over, millennia, 
so that the Armageddon scenario he predicts, insofar as it 
suggests that sea level rises of 7 metres might occur in the 
immediate future, is not in line with the scientific consensus.305 
It was also difficult to substantiate Gore’s claim that Pacific 
Islanders have all had to flee to New Zealand due to 
anthropogenic global warming that has inundated Pacific 
atolls.306  Justice Burton responded that there is simply no such 
evidence of evacuation happening yet.307  Seasonal work 
programs and sporting incentives—rugby perhaps—may provide 
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some supplementary economic incentive to migrate but not 
climate change. 
In reference to “Shutting down of the ‘ocean conveyor”’ Al 
Gore remarked that: 
At the end of the last ice age . . . that pump shut off and the heat 
transfer stopped and Europe went back into an ice age for 
another 900 or 1000 years. Of course that’s not going to happen 
again, because glaciers of North America are not there.  Is there 
any big chunk of ice anywhere near there? Oh yeah [pointing at 
Greenland].308 
In response, Justice Burton stated, “According to the IPCC, it is 
very unlikely that the ocean conveyor (known technically as the 
Meridional Overturning Circulation or thermohaline circulation) 
will shut down in the future, though it is considered likely that 
thermohaline circulation may slow down.”309  Arguments that 
there was a “direct coincidence between rise in CO2 in the 
atmosphere and in temperature” establishing an “exact fit” were 
invalid. 
Claims that Mount Kilimanjaro’s snows are vanishing, that 
Lake Chad is evaporating, and that polar bears are disappearing 
could simply not be substantiated as being attributable to 
human-induced climate change.310  At the time of the film there 
had been no evidence to establish that retreating snowlines from 
Mt. Kilimanjaro were attributable to human-induced climate 
change.311  Justice Burton considered the drying up of Lake Chad 
to be “far more likely to result from other factors, such as 
population increase and over-grazing, and regional climate 
variability.”312  Likewise, Hurricane Katrina was not then 
attributable to a nexus between weather and climate change.313 
Other errors in the film related to the integrity of 
information disseminated about coral reefs. Gore argued: 
 
 308. Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Court Berlin] Jan. 10, 2006, 10 
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 310. Id. ¶ 29-32. 
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 312. Id. ¶ 30. 
 313. Id. ¶ 31. 
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Coral reefs all over the world because of global warming and 
other factors are bleaching and they end up like this.  All the fish 
species that depend on the coral reef are also in jeopardy as a 
result.  Overall species loss is now occurring at a rate 1000 times 
greater than the natural background rate.314 
In reference to the scientific view of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), Justice Burton observed that “if the 
temperature were to rise by 1-3 degrees Centigrade, there would 
be increased coral bleaching and widespread coral mortality, 
unless corals could adopt or acclimatize, but that separating the 
impacts of climate change-related stresses from other stresses, 
such as over-fishing and polluting, is difficult.”315 
In conclusion, the Court determined that the film AIT could 
be shown, subject to certain conditions.316  Apparent flaws in 
informational integrity were to be corrected.317  Provided the 
apparent errors were corrected and the film shown under 
appropriate guidance, children should be stimulated into 
discussion and debate about climate change from the perspectives 
of science, geography, and citizenship. 
A plethora of climate change related cases have also emerged 
in the United States.  In his work on “Global Warming in the 
Courts,” Pidot identifies four main categories of litigation before 
U.S. state and federal courts.318  First, Clean Air Act litigation 
considers whether GHG emissions are a type of pollutant subject 
to regulation under the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).319  Second, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
litigation results from inadequate disclosure of climate change 
consequences arising from projects addressing environmental 
quality.320  Third, a collection of climate change disputes may fall 
 
 314. Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Court Berlin] Jan. 10, 2006, 10 
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 318. Justin R. Pidot, Global Warming in the Courts, GEO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
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 320. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4344. 
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under the tort of nuisance.321  Fourth, pre-emption litigation 
revolves around disputes concerning state vis-a-vis federal 
competence in climate change claims and the regulation of GHG 
emissions.322 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007) 
was the first decision of the Supreme Court to consider the 
application of the Clean Air Act (CAA) to climate change.323 
Calling global warming “the most pressing environmental 
challenge of our time,” a group of States, local governments, and 
private organizations alleged in a petition for certiorari that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had abdicated its 
responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate the emissions 
of four greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide.324 
On the issue of standing, the U.S. Supreme Court considered 
that the jurisdictional argument of requiring at least one 
practitioner to have standing was of a “serious character,” but in 
the “absence of any conflicting decisions . . . the unusual 
importance of the underlying issue persuaded [the Court] to grant 
the writ.”325 
In April 2007, the Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA that 
the CAA gives the EPA statutory authority to regulate tailpipe 
emissions from new motor vehicles because tailpipe emissions are 
“greenhouse gases [that] fit well within the Clean Air Act’s 
capacious definition of ‘air pollutant.’”326  By authorizing the EPA 
to regulate GHG emissions, the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA 
results in regulation beyond motor vehicles.  Smith points out 
that “the EPA can avoid promulgating such regulations only if it 
determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate 
change.”327  In 2011, the Court clarified that “Massachusetts 
 
 321. Pidot, supra note 318, at 1. 
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 323. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 324. Id.  at 505 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 325. Id. at 505-06. 
 326. Id. at 532. 
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made plain that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air 
pollution subject to regulation under the [Clean Air] Act.”328 
The petition was significant for several reasons, two of which 
were prominent.  The first reason related to non-state actors, in 
that a powerful public-private sector lobby supported the petition.  
Second, was the opinion that GHG emissions are pollutants to be 
regulated under the statutory authority of the CAA.  (CAA 
litigation aims to compel a regulator to take a specific action, i.e. 
give effect to positive and negative rights). 
In an injunctive form, another entire suite of climate change 
litigation aims to curtail a private company from acting, i.e. gives 
effect to a negative right.  Polluting emissions from coal-fired 
plants have long been controversial and are arguably a 
contravention of the CAA.  Such disputes concerning GHG 
emissions came under scrutiny by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
2007 decision Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp. when 
a group of environmental NGO’s brought a claim against one of 
America’s largest power generation companies.329 
Duke Energy made several construction modifications to its 
plants, which permitted the company to operate longer hours and 
thereby increase annual net emissions.  The company argued that 
there was no change in hourly emissions.  Duke Energy did not 
therefore obtain an EPA approval permit for the modifications.  It 
was unclear though as to why the EPA should put such a gloss on 
whether information should be based on hourly emissions or an 
increase in emissions.  Rabinowitsh points to the Washington 
Post’s take on this issue: “[i]t should not take the Supreme Court 
to determine what it means to ‘increase’ the air pollution put out 
by power plants.”330 
Disclosure goals of NEPA were considered in line with the 
dictum of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Idaho 
Sporting Congress v. Thomas.331  Idaho Sporting Congress v. 
 
 328. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). 
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Thomas concerned the potential impacts of a timber sale within 
the Targhee National Forest in Idaho.  The court held that in 
preparing an assessment of the impacts of a timber sale under 
NEPA the United States Forest Service (USFS) must provide the 
data underlying its expert’s opinion that the project will not 
result in significant environmental impacts.332  In essence, 
disclosure goals of NEPA are responsive, i.e. “to insure the agency 
has fully contemplated the environmental effects of its action,” 
and anticipatory, i.e. “to insure the public has sufficient 
information to challenge the agency.”333 
Justice Stevens delivered a relevant opinion in Robertson v. 
Methow Valley Citizens Council (1989).  Stevens stated: 
The sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of NEPA are thus 
realized through a set of “action-forcing” procedures that require 
that agencies take a “‘hard look’ at environmental consequences,” 
and that provide for broad dissemination of relevant 
environmental information.  Although these procedures are 
almost certain to affect the agency’s substantive decision, it is 
now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular 
results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.334 
The Supreme Court gave weight to both proactive 
(anticipatory consequences) and reactive (responsive) obligations 
embodied in the right to information. 
American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut is a far more 
recent dispute that demonstrates even further the conspicuous 
position of non-state actors to influence climate law.335  It 
demonstrates the importance of “conduct norms” at the local 
level.  It clarifies the relationships with federal common law. 
In its original context the dispute concerned controls to be 
placed on corporate emitters of harmful carbon dioxide 
emissions.336  Did five electric power companies (American 
Electric Power, Duke Energy, Southern Company, Tennessee 
 
 332. Id. at 1154. 
 333. Id. at 1149. 
 334. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) 
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 336. See id. at 314. 
71
  
2012] RIGHT TO KNOW AND DUTY TO DISCLOSE 211 
 
Valley Authority, and Xcel) create a “public nuisance” by 
contributing to global warming?  Plaintiffs asserted that the 
companies emitted “650 million tons per year of carbon 
dioxide,”337 which comprised “approximately ten percent of all 
carbon dioxide emissions from human activities in the United 
States.”338  Another important question was whether states and 
private parties could seek injunctive relief under the federal 
common law of nuisance to cap a company’s carbon dioxide 
emissions at judicially determined levels.339 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit identified 
two elements of public nuisance: (i) an “unreasonable 
interference,” and (ii) “a right common to the general public.”340  
In determining “unreasonableness” the Second Circuit further 
cited three mutually exclusive circumstances when an 
interference with a common public right is unreasonable: (a) the 
conduct involves a significant interference with common public 
rights (health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience), (b) the 
conduct is proscribed by law, and (c) “whether the conduct is of a 
continuing nature or has produced a permanent and long-lasting 
effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a 
significant effect upon the public right.”341  Interestingly, the 
Second Circuit applied the same logical distinction between 
conduct and result that is so firmly entrenched in European civil 
law. 
Environmental lobbyists pursuing the claim that carbon 
dioxide emissions are a nuisance, and should be capped or 
reduced, faced a setback in 2010 when the U.S. Acting Solicitor 
General (Neal Katyal) argued that the plaintiffs did not have 
standing.342  For the U.S. Department of Justice, such disputes 
were more suited for Congress and the executive branch rather 
than judicial resolutions: the Courts were not de facto 
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regulators.343  On December 6, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court 
said it would issue a writ of certiorari granting review of the 
lower court’s decision.344 
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court was presented 
with three specific questions.  Do states and individuals have 
standing to sue on the common law tort of nuisance for injuries 
allegedly caused by climate change?345  Are such arguments non-
justiciable as political questions?346  Is the equitable tort of 
nuisance displaced by legislation regulating greenhouse gas 
emissions, notably that of the CAA or NEPA?347 
American Electric Power Company Inc. et al. filed their 
respective briefs on January 31, 2011, and Connecticut et al. filed 
on March 11, 2011.348  In addition to these briefs, amici curiae 
briefs made public and private interests known.349 
In deciding the case on June 20, 2011, the Supreme Court 
found that the CAA confers powers on the EPA to manage GHG 
emissions.350  The Court referred to the EPA’s response to the 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA: the EPA has started a 
rulemaking under § 7411 of the CAA.351  Section 7411 addresses 
standards for limiting emissions of air pollutants from “new, 
modified and existing fossil-fuel fired power plants.”352  The 
Court put the spotlight on the EPA’s obligations: “Pursuant to a 
settlement finalized in March 2011, EPA has committed to 
issuing . . . a final rule by May 2012.”353 
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73
  
2012] RIGHT TO KNOW AND DUTY TO DISCLOSE 213 
 
The Supreme Court held that “the Clean Air Act and the 
actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to 
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired 
power plants.”354  Further, there is a new federal common law for 
subjects of national concern: “When we deal with air and water in 
their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common 
law.”355  It is not a question of a “federal general common law” 
but a question of an emerging “new federal common law.”356  The 
decision is therefore critically important to the broader study that 
informs this Article insofar that a universal “new federal common 
law” is emerging to regulate the global commons.  A jus gentium 
may emerge ad hoc or it may emerge through good governance. 
In making its decision the Supreme Court endorsed a new 
constitutional model of international climate law, one that 
derives from the object and purpose of the legislation.  When a 
competent authority confers powers on a third party the mandate 
of the third party is to be legally binding, i.e. valid because it is 
legitimate and effective.  Rather than displace equity, legislative 
codification gives effect to equity if it facilitates the fulfillment of 
rights and obligations through, inter alia, accountability, 
integrity, and temporality conferred on competent agencies.  For 
the Supreme Court, “[t]he test for whether congressional 
legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law is 
simply whether the statute ‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at 
issue.”357  The CAA clarifies that it is for the EPA to set emission 
standards and therefore “speaks directly to the question at 
issue.”358  Indeed, in comparison to federal judges, it makes sense 
that a specialized agency ought to be more equipped to leverage 
scientific, economic, and technological competence in deciding 
how to regulate emissions. 
The agency can no longer argue that it does not have 
authority to regulate GHG emissions.  In the event the EPA fails 
to be effective, i.e. “does not set emission limits for a particular 
pollutant or source of pollution,” then “States and private parties 
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may petition for a rulemaking, and EPA’s response will be 
reviewable in federal court.”359  Simply stated, if the EPA does 
not carry out its statutory duties, the plaintiffs could end up back 
in the Supreme Court via a Court of Appeals review, and, 
ultimately, a petition for certiorari.  However, “were EPA to 
decline to regulate [CO2] emissions altogether at the conclusion of 
its . . . rulemaking, the federal courts would have no warrant to 
employ the federal common law of nuisance to upset the agency’s 
expert determination.”360  The decision thereby blocked states 
and non-state actors from going to the federal courts to file for 
public nuisance; but they could go to court to request a 
determination as to the scope and application of the CAA, subject 
to exhausting their avenues via the EPA first. 
While the EPA currently “occupies the field” for making 
determinations under the CAA, a far more interesting question 
relates to the nature of the EPA’s take on the rulemaking.  To 
date, environmental lobbyists have been concerned about EPA’s 
indecision, but EPA now knows that if it does not follow the nod 
of the Supreme Court that it could soon find itself in court again 
and be subject to review. 
In addition, there are likely to be some complex 
multidimensional issues involved.  With respect to trade, what 
will be the take on powerful private actors benefiting from states 
with weaker climate laws and then trading energy to stronger 
states, e.g. those that have adopted climate change norms 
through regional cap-and-trade programs? 
The equitable tort of public nuisance is not closed.  There is 
an evolving federal common law of the commons.  Another 
interesting question concerns state nuisance, which depends on, 
inter alia, the preemptive effect of the CAA.361  (A state law could 
be invalid if it contradicts a federal law).  If a federal common 
climate law confers on the EPA then it could be argued that the 
EPA also has a duty to ensure that the CAA preempts any 
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inconsistent state law.362  In American Electric Power, the 
Supreme Court left the question of relief under state law open for 
consideration on remand.363  But the Court also referred to the 
Clean Water Act as not precluding plaintiffs from bringing a case 
for nuisance at the state level.364  The aforementioned trade-
related cases that are at the nexus of competition law and climate 
law may well reappear as nuisance claims at the state level. 
While the issue will be reviewed in conformity with the 
decision of the Supreme Court, it is still to be seen whether a 
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court (if it gets that far) will 
consider the preemption of public nuisance claims.  If so, will the 
relevant court look beyond causation to ascertain, first and 
foremost, whether emitting excessive carbon-dioxide pollutants is 
an equitable nuisance per se?  If so, there will be no need to 
confine the hearing to statutory interpretation of a plethora of 
crisscrossing laws or to prove that such activity impinges on the 
enjoyment of life.  Liability would be absolute and injury to the 
public, perhaps even injury to future generations, would be 
presumed by the nature of the very action of emitting excessive 
carbon dioxide.  As a result, the right to relief would be 
established by averment and proof of the mere activity would be 
all that is needed.  Even if the dispute on standing does move to 
incorporate causation, and causation is proved, there is always 
the issue of redressability with which to contend.  The petitioners 
could counter-argue that the relief sought by the plaintiffs will 
not slow global warming or prevent future harm without much 
heavier commitments by the U.S. and other states to reductions 
in GHG emissions. 
In terms of public nuisance, the flooding of a small Alaskan 
village may be the next major decision in climate law.365  In 
question is whether energy companies contributed to GHG 
emissions and rising sea levels that flooded and destroyed a 
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native Alaskan village of Kivalina and displaced local villagers.366  
Any future developments ought to be watched with keen interest, 
not only from the U.S. and common law countries, but also by the 
international community. 
2. . . . And a Duty to Disclose 
Advancing agreed guidelines at the global level remains 
important because climate change crosses borders and invokes a 
new law of the global commons.  Giving effect to these guidelines 
is both an individual and collective responsibility.  It also 
concerns state and non-state actor accountability.  To bring these 
dynamics into the fold, this section provides an overview of some 
of the international framework issues for reporting under the 
UNFCCC.  It introduces the role of corporate responsibility as a 
lead in to the following section, which compares and contrasts 
climate disclosure obligations in the U.S. with those in the U.K. 
a. International Guidelines for National 
Communications 
The UNFCCC COP adopted guidelines for the preparation of 
national communications by Annex I countries (decision 17/CP.7) 
and Non-Annex I countries (decision 17/CP.8) in 2002.367  In 
December 2011, the UNFCCC COP 17 reinforced in Durban that 
a shared vision for long term cooperation “should be guided by the 
principles of equity and common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities,” an Article 3 (1) 
UNFCCC provision.368  In line with this direction, the COP 
meeting in Durban adopted new national guidelines for enhanced 
action on mitigation from developed and developing countries.  
These actions, which cover biennial reporting guidelines for both 
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developed and developing countries, and a registry for 
international support to developing countries, will be subject to 
international scrutiny.369 
Besides obligations on developed countries, there is a 
legitimate expectation that developing countries will also honor 
their commitments consistent with their respective capabilities.  
Factors for consideration include needs assessments, the capacity 
to report on national greenhouse gas inventories, the capacity to 
inventory mitigation actions, and the capacity to report on all the 
aid received and dispensed from state and non-state actors.  
Whether the support received has been effective and produced 
results also requires examination by the entire global community.  
In short, work towards a common and effective accounting 
framework applicable to all will be essential to reinforcing a law 
of the global commons and strengthening a right to information 
as a fundamental “peoples” right. 
At the end of 2012, the UNFCCC COP meeting in Qatar 
recognized this proposed approach to identifying “common 
elements” for developed countries insofar that the COP 
decided to establish a work programme under the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to continue the 
process of clarifying the quantified economy-wide emission 
reduction targets of developed country Parties, particularly in 
relation to the elements contained in decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 
5, with a view to: (a)  Identifying common elements for measuring 
the progress made towards the achievement of the quantified 
economy-wide emission reduction targets; (b)  Ensuring the 
comparability of efforts among developed country Parties, taking 
into account differences in their national circumstances.370 
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Proper reporting is a critical aspect of the right to 
information.  It will help to ensure a robust common accounting 
framework in order to facilitate transparency in counting 
emission reductions, avoid the double provision of national and 
international aid to developing countries, and help to measure 
and verify the tangible results of aid provided by a plurality of 
international actors.  These issues lead naturally to a discussion 
on corporate responsibility.  
b. Corporate Responsibility 
Private companies gained a victory in American Electric 
Power.  However, so-called procedural equity, which in this 
context is really a type of subjective equity, does not 
automatically foreclose liability.  A recent vitality in the duty to 
disclose has sparked a series of obligations for non-state actors.  
Private companies are no longer immune to climate change 
regulations and disclosure of activities. 
Indeed, for many companies there is an increasing concern 
with respect to reporting requirements—and rightly so. The 
world’s largest companies are some of the main contributors to 
GHG emissions.  According to the Carbon Disclosure Project’s 
(CDP) 2011 Supply Chain Report, “the emissions of about 2,500 of 
the largest global corporations account for roughly 20-25% of the 
world’s GHG emissions.”371  Writing in 2012, the CDP went 
further to say that “climate change has become a mainstream 
business issue.”372 
Not surprisingly, a number of companies seem to have little 
difficulty in quantifying the harm others cause them, yet these 
same companies often seem to be in a state of denial as to their 
concomitant obligations.  When it comes to risk management and 
disclosure many companies are able to pinpoint precise 
geographical regions where harm occurs and set in place 
programs for compensation (albeit not necessarily in Alaska). 
 
 371. A.T. KEARNEY, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, SUPPLY CHAIN REPORT 2011: 
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COLLABORATION 1 (2011). 
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The 2012 CDP Supply Chain Report provides a number of 
examples.  “PepsiCo estimates its total potential exposure to 
ingredients and agriculture from changes in climate at $12 billion 
per year.”373  In response, PepsiCo helped its suppliers in 
Southern Chile to “upgrade their irrigation systems, leading to a 
35% reduction in water use.”374  Walmart “estimated that its 
60,000 suppliers contributed 72% of the company’s total 
emissions as of 2006.”375  In response, it focused on setting new 
energy targets in its top 200 factories in China.”376 
While recognizing geographic self-harm from climate change 
and devising corrective solutions, companies acknowledge the 
difficulty in “determining a clear return on investment for supply 
chain measures.”377  In parallel, as companies take even more 
resolute strides to manage climate risk, investors ought to 
demand more rigorous accounting standards in GHG emissions 
disclosure.  Improved legal standards could address traceability 
and exposure to water risk throughout the climate value chain.  
As CDP points out, not only do conglomerates have to be able to 
measure, quantify, and report their GHG emissions, but their 
suppliers must be able to do so also.378 
For investors, the report launched by Mercer’s Responsible 
Investment team in February 2011, titled “Climate Change 
Scenarios - Implications for Strategic Asset Allocation,” observes 
that “climate policy could contribute as much as 10% to overall 
portfolio risk” over the next twenty years.379  Risk exposure is 
also prominent at the climate-water nexus.  Recent disasters in 
Pakistan and Thailand are illustrative.  “Hennes & Mauritz 
(H&M) reported a surprise 30% fall in profits in the first quarter 
of 2011, largely because the price of cotton doubled in the 
previous 12 months as a result of increased global demand and 
disruption to supplies caused by drought and floods in cotton 
 
 373. Id. at 7. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. See id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. See id. at 9. 
 379. MERCER, CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS - IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC ASSET 
ALLOCATION 1 (2011), available at http://www.mercer.com/climatechange. 
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producing countries like Pakistan.”380  Outsourcing to low-cost 
Thailand also came at a cost: “severe floods in this region in 
October 2011 caused a shortage in the supply of hard disks 
around the world.”381  “In 2011 the Yangtze delta, which supports 
400 million people and 40% of China’s economic activity, 
experienced its worst drought in 50 years . . . [and] led to power 
cuts that dampened manufacturing output, and disrupted 
distribution channels by closing river networks, including 
hundreds of kilometers of the Yangtze and its tributaries.”382  
While isolating a single root cause is near impossible, part of the 
problem is due to climate change. 
A 2008 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
study flagged an additional investor concern when it “listed 
climate change as the number one risk facing the insurance 
industry.”383  The IPCC advances further and declares that there 
is a lack of insurer appetite to cover climate losses.  As a result, 
investors are left with restricted, or non-existent, flood insurance 
due to the “high concentration of losses due to catastrophic 
floods.”384 
On March 17, 2009, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners adopted a compulsory requirement for insurance 
companies to disclose financial risks from climate change to 
regulators.385  In addition, insurance companies have to report 
the actions they are taking to respond to those risks.386  An 
extract from the press release reads, “All insurance companies 
with annual premiums of $500 million or more will be required to 
 
 380. ACCENTURE, supra note 372, at 14. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
 383. SEC Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 211, 231 & 241), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106fr.pdf. 
 384. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
WATER, IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER ON CLIMATE CHANGE 75 (Bryson Bates et al. eds., 
2008). 
 385. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Insurance Comm’rs, Insurance 
Regulators Adopt Climate Change Risk Disclosure (Mar. 17, 2009) (on file with 
author), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2009_docs/climate_change_ 
risk_disclosure_adopted.htm. 
 386. Id. 
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complete an Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey every year, 
with an initial reporting deadline of May 1, 2010.”387 
Climate risk is an investment risk.  Managing climate risk 
exposure gives impetus to the growing rise in socially responsible 
investment law.  In March 2011, the Financial Times reported, 
“Twenty U.S. companies have agreed to take more account of 
environmental issues, such as water use and greenhouse gas 
emissions, as a result of investor resolutions, in a sign of 
increased pressure on industries, such as power generation and 
oil and gas production.”388  Ceres cites four climate change risks 
that will influence investment and impinge on investor decisions: 
physical risks, regulatory risks, litigation risks, and risks to 
reputation.389  Investors have a right to know about the extent of 
the climate risks.  Companies have a duty to disclose. 
Incumbent upon many companies is the duty to reveal 
information and to establish and maintain disclosure controls.  It 
is equally important to ensure that information collection and 
dissemination is not an exercise for the sake of exercising.  
Companies should not be set under such pressures to search for 
unproven or unknown information simply to appease investor 
appetite. 
Some companies are providing information about climate 
risk, their carbon footprints, and their initiatives to reduce them.  
Others are uncertain about their obligations and probably worry 
about the integrity of the data to be released.  What is certain is 
that investors around the world are clamoring for relevant 
information.  What is uncertain is how to discipline an 
information provision to uphold the subjective tests of equity, 
which are tests of effect.  Such concerns may be unwarranted 
provided one may lift the corporate veil to discipline the right to 
 
 387. Id. 
 388. Ed Crooks, US Companies Yield to Environmental Push, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 
7, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ccc960a2-48eb-11e0-af8c-00144feab49a. 
html#axzz2B0UOefgO. 
 389. See BERKLEY ADRIO, CERES, CLEARING THE WATERS: A REVIEW OF 
CORPORATE WATER RISK DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS (June 2012), available at 
www.ceres.org/resources/reports/clearing-the-waters-a-review-of-corporate-
water-risk-disclosure-in-sec-filings/view. 
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information by way of employing the proposed objective and 
subjective tests of equity. 
3. Piercing the Veil 
The following section compares and contrasts climate 
disclosure obligations in the U.S. with those in the U.K.  Lifting 
the veil of incorporation may be just and equitable when it 
reveals that a constituent’s freedoms and duties extend beyond 
its obligations to traditional stakeholders.  A constituent with 
conferred powers may have common but differentiated obligations 
to the global community as a whole.  It may play a pivotal role in 
giving effect to the universal constitutionalism of international 
climate law. This section thereby includes but goes beyond state 
responsibility.  It demonstrates how mobilizing the right to 
information as a normative derivative of equity may affect shared 
responsibility and a unified architecture of human rights in the 
global commons. 
a. Climate Disclosure Obligations in the U.S. 
Controversies concerning climate change disclosure 
requirements are emerging at a rapid pace.  Examples from the 
U.S. and the U.K. are illustrative.  Controversies surround the 
Kyoto Protocol and instruments for “cap-and-trade.”  The U.S. 
has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol while Canada denounced 
the Protocol in December 2011.390  Conversely, the U.K. ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol.  The U.S. has seen a number of recent cap-
and-trade bills collapse before Congress.  The U.K. has seen its 
climate change bill succeed before Parliament.  Despite these 
radical departures, the duty to disclose climate change 
information remains equally pressing on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
In the U.S., the Waxman Markey cap-and-trade bill, also 
known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
 
 390. Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php (last visited Nov. 17, 
2012); Canada Pulls Out of, Denounces Kyoto Protocol, CBSNEWS.COM, Dec. 13, 
2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57341907/canada-pulls-out-of-
denounces-kyoto-protocol/. 
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H.R. 2454,391 passed in the House on June 26, 2009.  However, it 
did not pass in the Senate insofar as it was placed on the Senate 
Legislative Calendar (July 7, 2009) and did not come up for a 
vote.392 
The energy bill aimed “to create clean energy jobs, achieve 
energy independence, reduce global warming pollution and 
transition to a clean energy economy.”393  A cap-and-trade system 
would have introduced a broad range of carbon tariffs to foreign 
imports that did not comply with U.S. regulatory requirements 
for climate change.  For the U.S., however, there would have been 
a broad range of export exceptions, rebates, and allowances.  The 
bill foresaw derogations for developing countries; however, for 
foreign companies operating in the U.S., the U.S. would have in 
essence regulated their climate change regimes on a de facto basis 
through U.S. disclosure requirements.394  It would have been for 
the U.S. Administration to notify foreign countries of products 
that would not be exempted from certain aspects of the regulatory 
regime.395 
In some ways the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009 (a bill) was a spin on the European Union’s Emission 
Trading Scheme.  (Some of the proposed disclosure provisions 
gave rise to similar controversies in the context of regulating 
cross border aviation emissions, issues that will be discussed 
below).  Given the structure of the bill’s discriminatory privileges, 
however, meant that it could have provided an even greater 
incentive to maximize rent seeking and minimize state 
responsibility for emission trading. 
The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act is another 
relevant bill that introduces an economy-wide cap-and-trade 
 
 391. Related bills include H.R. RES 587, 111th Cong. (2009), American Clean 
Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2998, 111th Cong. (2009), and Clean 
Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 392. See Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009 - 2010), H.R.2454, THE 
LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.2454: (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
 393. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 394. See id. 
 395. Id. § 765(c)(1). 
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program.396  Also known by its sponsor as the “Kerry-Boxer” bill, 
the bill was introduced September 30, 2009 and placed on the 
U.S. Senate’s Legislative Agenda under general orders on 
February 2, 2010.397  The “Kerry-Boxer” bill aims to “create clean 
energy jobs, promote energy independence, reduce global 
warming pollution, and transition to a clean energy economy.”398  
By virtue of Economy-wide Emission Reduction Goals (Section 3; 
S.1733), the bill provides for the steady reduction in GHG 
emissions such that: 
(1) [I]n 2012, the quantity of United States greenhouse gas 
emissions does not exceed 97 percent of the quantity of United 
States greenhouse gas emissions in 2005; (2) in 2020, the 
quantity of United States greenhouse gas emissions does not 
exceed 80 percent of the quantity of United States greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2005; (3) in 2030, the quantity of United States 
greenhouse gas emissions does not exceed 58 percent of the 
quantity of United States greenhouse gas emissions in 2005; and 
(4) in 2050, the quantity of United States greenhouse gas 
emissions does not exceed 17 percent of the quantity of United 
States greenhouse gas emissions in 2005.399 
Put differently, the bill sets goals to reduce U.S. GHG 
emissions below a 2005 baseline year.400  The goals are 
progressive: a reduction of three percent below the 2005 baseline 
by 2012,401 twenty percent below the 2005 baseline by 2020,402 
 
 396. See Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. §§ 
702, 703(a) (2009) (amended 2010); Victor B. Flatt, “Offsetting” Crisis? - Climate 
Change Cap-and-Trade Need Not Contribute to Another Financial Meltdown, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. 619 (2012). 
 397. Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010), S.1733, THE LIBRARY 
OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:S1733: (last visited Nov. 
17, 2012). 
 398. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(amended 2010). 
 399. Id. § 3. 
 400. See id. § 3(1). 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. § 3(2). 
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forty-two percent below the 2005 baseline by 2030,403 and eighty-
three percent below the 2005 baseline by 2050.404 
In sum, the Waxman Markey cap-and-trade bill did not 
manage to secure a Senate vote and the “Kerry-Boxer” bill 
remains on the Senate Legislative Calendar but has not 
progressed any further.  A Congress reluctant to “cap-and-trade” 
is not, however, to say that Congress is reticent on the entire 
climate law issue.  Congress has a long established history of 
recognizing climate rights.  (The National Climate Program Act of 
1978, the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, the Global 
Change Research Act 1990 are pertinent examples; and, of 
course, the Bush Administration signed the UNFCCC in 1992). 
Back in 2008, Congress found that there was a difference 
between regulating GHG emissions and studying the issues more 
thoroughly.  The Consolidated Appropriations Act 2008 
established a Climate Change Study Committee to investigate 
and study issues relating to global climate change, make 
recommendations as to needed steps, and facilitate a declaration 
of Congress’s existing findings.405  Section 430 of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act 2008 stipulates clearly: 
(a) The Congress finds that - (1) greenhouse gases accumulating 
in the atmosphere are causing average temperatures to rise at a 
rate outside the range of natural variability and are posing a 
substantial risk of rising sea-levels, altered patterns of 
atmospheric and oceanic circulation, and increased frequency and 
severity of floods, droughts, and wildfires; (2) there is a growing 
scientific consensus that human activity is a substantial cause of 
greenhouse gas accumulation in the atmosphere; and (3) 
mandatory steps will be required to slow or stop the growth of 
greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere.  
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that there should be enacted a 
comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory, 
market-based limits and incentives on emissions of greenhouse 
gases that slow, stop, and reverse the growth of such emissions at 
a rate and in a manner that: (1) will not significantly harm the 
 
 403. Id. § 3(3). 
 404. Id. § 3(4). 
 405. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 114(a), 
121 Stat. 1844, 1897 (2007). 
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United States economy; and (2) will encourage comparable action 
by other nations that are major trading partners and key 
contributors to global emissions.406 
At an agency level the EPA’s endangerment finding of 
December 2009, effective January 14, 2010, is important.  “The 
Administrator finds that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health 
and to endanger public welfare.”407  If the second circuit in AEP v. 
Connecticut were to be followed, an argument could be made that 
the endangerment finding establishes a de facto test of 
unreasonableness if a company continues to harm a public right.  
Proponents of this view might suggest that a company wrongfully 
causes an injury by wrongfully omitting to curb GHG emissions. 
Giving legal security to the right to information through 
enhanced disclosure duties imposes a far more burdensome 
obligation on companies.  It is rather peculiar that the failure to 
do so may open the door to hold non-state actors accountable 
anyhow.  Companies will have to be ever more vigilant.  U.S. 
companies with commercial presence in member states ratifying 
the Kyoto Protocol may of course fall under the ambit of Kyoto 
Compliance.408  Internally though, U.S. companies also have a 
number of disclosure obligations under federal security laws and 
regulations. 
The SEC published interpretative guidance for public 
companies on climate change disclosure on February 8, 2010.409  
The Commission’s guidance regarding U.S. rules of disclosure 
refer, inter alia, to the framework of the requisite forms regulated 
by Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X,410 and to certain material 
 
 406. Id. § 430. 
 407. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66495, 66497 (Dec. 15, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 408. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 252. 
 409. SEC Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 211, 231 & 241), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106fr.pdf. 
 410. Id. at 6293. 
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information required of Securities Act Rule 408 and Exchange Act 
Rule 12b-20.411 
As early as the 1970s, the SEC issued guidance on the 
disclosure of material climate change information that could 
impact on a company’s financial condition.412  The SEC 
considered the Supreme Court’s referral in Basic Inc. v. Levinson 
to the materiality test evoked in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway 
(1976): “[T]o fulfill the materiality requirement, ‘there must be a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.’”413  Any examination of the facts demands a 
systematic evaluation within the relevant regulatory context as to 
which facts are material. 
The SEC briefly outlines specific disclosure requirements 
under Regulation S-K.414  U.S. companies may disclose climate 
change information when describing their business under Item 
101 of Regulation S-K;415 but they must disclose capital costs, 
earnings, and competitive influences of a contingent, known, or 
certain material effect.416  Item 101 is therefore focused on the 
economic and financial costs of compliance.417  It is for the 
company to disclose whatever environmental information is 
material to future reporting cycles.418 
Item 103 of Regulation S-K provides for disclosure of climate 
change related litigation of a material effect.419  To illustrate, if 
the dispute concerns environmental law, then the company must 
disclose an administrative or judicial proceeding if it is material 
 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. at 6292-93. 
 413. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); see also TSC Indus. 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 414. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure 
Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6293 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 
17 C.F.R. Parts 211, 231 & 241), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/ 
2010/33-9106fr.pdf [hereinafter Sec. & Exch. Guidance]. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. 
 417. See id. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. 
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to a company’s business or financial condition.  Item 103 also 
designates disclosure thresholds, which are indicative of 
information of a material effect.420 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires a management 
discussion and analysis of the company’s financial condition and 
operational results.421  It provides the opportunity for investors to 
see a company through the manager’s eyes and through a 
qualitative and far more subjective discussion of the business.  
The enquiry is two-fold.  First, is the uncertainty of a trend or 
event reasonably likely to occur or is there a conjecture of a 
knowable possibility?422  (There is an assumption of uncertainty 
unless management can conclude otherwise).423  Second, if the 
trend or event is reasonably likely to occur, or a knowable 
possibility could be of a material effect, then the company must 
disclose.424  (Non-disclosure can only be justified when 
management can determine that the occurrence of the trend or 
event is not reasonably likely to have a material effect on the 
company).425 
Significant climate change factors may well lead to relevant 
industry, company, or investment risks, and there is a growing 
tendency for companies to abide by disclosing specific risks rather 
than simply using boilerplate templates.  Climate change 
disclosure may therefore also concur with the disclosure of risk 
factors by virtue of Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K.426 
In sum, the SEC identifies Items 101, 103, 303, and 503(c) of 
Regulation S-K as potential “triggers” of climate change 
disclosure.427  In addition, certain states have their own 
particularities.  Some require CO2 emissions reporting, such as 
for electricity companies.428 
 
 420. Sec. & Exch. Guidance, supra note 414. 
 421. Id. at 6294. 
 422. Id.at 6295. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. at 6295-96. 
 427. Jeffery M. McFarland, Warming Up to Climate Change Risk Disclosure, 
14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 281, 290 (2009). 
 428. Id. at 304. 
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A 2011 Ceres report evaluated the degree to which U.S. 
companies reporting is consistent with SEC guidelines.  The 
report entitled, “Disclosing Climate Risks: A Guide for Corporate 
Executives, Attorneys & Directors” reads, “Despite the SEC 
guidance, this report’s review of companies’ most recent 10-K 
filings shows that improvements in climate risk disclosure have 
been incremental at best.  And while voluntary reporting on 
climate risks is helpful, it is not sufficient.”429  The SEC points 
out too that voluntary company disclosure can in no way become 
a substitute for a cohesive de jure governing framework of 
conformity and compliance regulation.430  Such pitfalls have 
already been observed at the international level. 
While there are critics, the U.S. has not only long recognized 
the importance of climate rights, but also of building a 
comprehensive national policy and de jure frameworks for climate 
change disclosure.  The National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 establishes a national policy for the environment,431 
provides for the establishment of a Council on Environmental 
Quality,432 and sets out detailed information and impact 
assessment requirements.433  The Environmental Impact 
Statement required by NEPA is an environmental disclosure 
document.434 
Moreover, the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases 
Rule (40 C.F.R Part 98) was an EPA response to the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act 2008 and has legal authority under its 
existing CAA authority.435  In its summary, the “Part 98” Rule 
reads: 
 
 429. JIM COBURN ET AL., CERES, DISCLOSING CLIMATE RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES IN 
SEC FILINGS: A GUIDE FOR CORPORATE EXECUTIVES, ATTORNEYS & DIRECTORS 2 
(2011) (“Ceres is a national coalition of investors, environmental groups[,] and 
other public interest organizations working with companies to address 
sustainability challenges such as global climate change.”). 
 430. Id. at 4. 
 431. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). 
 432. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970). 
 433. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). 
 434. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (1975); see also Climate Change, US EPA, 
http://epa.gov/climatechange/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
 435. 40 C.F.R. § 98 (issued by the EPA in response to the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2008). 
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EPA is promulgating a regulation to require reporting of 
greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors of the economy.  The 
final rule applies to fossil fuel suppliers and industrial gas 
suppliers, direct greenhouse gas emitters and manufacturers of 
heavy-duty and off-road vehicles and engines.  The rule does not 
require control of greenhouse gases, rather it requires only that 
sources above certain threshold levels monitor and report 
emissions.436 
The Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) under 
Part 98 requires reporting of GHG data and other relevant 
information from large sources and suppliers in the US.  The 
EPA’s achievement in releasing 2010 nationwide GHG emissions 
data for large facilities and suppliers on January 11th 2012 is 
significant.  For the first time, comprehensive GHG emissions 
information was publically available across nine industry groups, 
including twenty-nine source categories, which directly emit GHG 
emissions in large quantities.437 
Part 98, as operated under EPA’s GHGRP, has also given rise 
to business concerns regarding the business impact from 
disclosure and the use of confidential data.438  These concerns 
pushed the consideration of three deferral actions into 2011.439  
Determinations remained on proposals to change reporting dates 
for certain data elements, to defer the reporting date for certain 
data elements, and to extend the comment period on inputs to 
emission equations.440 
The EPA made further progress in 2012.  On February 24, 
2012, the EPA issued a proposal to determine which data 
elements reported under subpart W of Part 98 (petroleum and 
natural gas) would or would not be entitled to confidential 
 
 436. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56260 (Oct. 30, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042, 
1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065). 
 437. Press Release, US EPA, 2010 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data from 
Large Facilities Now Available / First Release of Data Through the National 
GHG Reporting Program (Jan. 11, 2012) (on file with author). 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. 
91
  
2012] RIGHT TO KNOW AND DUTY TO DISCLOSE 231 
 
treatment under the CAA.441  These data elements were to be 
reported to EPA for the first time in September 2012.  In 
addition, this proposed rule proposes to defer the deadline for 
reporting some recently added subpart W data reporting elements 
that are “inputs to emission equations” until 2015.  An EPA 
notice of October 26, 2012, informs that certain named 
contractors will be permitted to access confidential business 
information submitted to EPA under the GHGRP “no sooner than 
November 6, 2012.”442  Materiality (an objective test) and access 
(a subjective test) have thereby become the linchpins of U.S. 
climate disclosure. 
EPA’s obligatory reporting rule reinforces the duty to a 
reasonable investor.  It should therefore come as no surprise that 
shareholder activism for companies to disclose information is 
mounting.  Concerns arise about how companies manage climate 
litigation risk.  Whether a company’s information disclosure is 
keeping up with its peers is another factor that affects share 
price. 
Enacting positive shareholder rights with concomitant 
proactive (anticipatory) and reactive (responsive) obligations on 
private companies is another pathway to meet the subjective tests 
of equitable rights to information.  Rule 14a-8 of the U.S. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides an opportunity for a 
shareholder to have his or her proposal included in the company’s 
proxy materials for presentation to a vote at an annual or special 
meeting.443  In general, the company is to include the 
shareholder’s proposal as long as it is valid and follows certain 
procedures.444  The proposal may be excluded if it falls within one 
of the substantive bases for exclusion.445 
 
 441. Proposed Confidentiality Determinations for the Petroleum and Natural 
Gas Systems Source Category, and Amendments to Table A–7 of the 
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 11039 (proposed Feb. 24, 2012), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-02-24/pdf/2012-4320.pdf. 
 442. Access by EPA Contractors To Confidential Business Information Related 
to the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 65377 (Oct. 26, 2012), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-10-26/pdf/2012-26425.pdf. 
 443. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). 
 444. See id. 
 445. Id. § 240.14a-8(f). 
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On November 15, 2011, the National Centre for Public Policy 
Research submitted its climate change risk disclosure proposal to 
General Electric (GE).446  The proposal reads: “The shareholders 
request that the Board of Directors prepare by November 2012, at 
reasonable expense and omitting proprietary information, a 
report disclosing the business risk related to developments in the 
scientific, political, legislative and regulatory landscape regarding 
climate change.”447  The sticking point for the National Centre for 
Public Policy Research is that GE may omit the proposal under 
Rule 14a-8(i)(12) if it “relates to substantially the same subject 
matter as three previously submitted proposals and the most 
recently submitted of those proposals did not receive the support 
necessary for resubmission.”448 
Demands on ExxonMobil are also illustrative of a similar 
argument of a proposal falling into an excluded category due to 
prior submission of a similar proposal.  The Corporate 
Responsibility Agent of the Province of St. Joseph of the 
Capuchin Order and supporters filed a resolution for inclusion in 
the proxy statement for the next annual meeting of ExxonMobil 
shareholders on December 6, 2011.  The proposal if resolved and 
not withdrawn, would have required 
ExxonMobil’s Board of Directors create a Climate Future Task 
Force including outside climate change experts to study how, like 
the insurance industry, ExxonMobil, at all levels, will “factor 
climate change into their models for measuring, pricing, and 
distributing risk” and other alternatives to its existing business 
model that depends on continued fossil fuel production and 
marketing. Barring competitive information, its conclusions shall 
 
 446. Letter from Amy Ridenour, Chairman, Nat’l Ctr. for Pub. Policy 
Research, to Brackett B. Denniston, Sec’y, Gen. Elec. Co. (Nov. 14, 2011) (on file 
with SEC at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/ 
nationalcenter011912-14a8.pdf). 
 447. Id. at 21. 
 448. E-mail from Ronald O. Mueller, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Office 
of Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 12, 2011) (on file 
with SEC at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/ 
nationalcenter011912-14a8.pdf). 
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be shared with requesting shareholders at reasonable cost within 
a year of the annual meeting.449 
However, all indications in correspondence of the SEC as at 
February 10, 2012, suggested that Exxon Mobile would include a 
proposal submitted by The Sisters of St. Dominic of Caldwell, 
New Jersey in its proxy materials for its upcoming annual 
meeting of security holders.450  The St. Dominic Proposal 
provides: 
Resolved: Shareholders request that the Board of Directors adopt 
quantitative goals, based on current technologies, for reducing 
total greenhouse gas emissions from the Company’s products and 
operations; and that the Company report to shareholders by 
November 30, 2012, on its plans to achieve these goals. Such a 
report will omit proprietary information and be prepared at 
reasonable cost.451 
Collective action eventually led to ExxonMobil including 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Goals in its Notice of 2012 Annual 
Meeting and Proxy Statement (item 9).452  While recommending a 
vote against the proposal, the ExxonMobil Board did make 
several relevant statements.  To quote, “As ExxonMobil seeks to 
increase production of oil and gas to meet growing global energy 
demand and to maintain leadership in return to shareholders, the 
Company will continue taking steps to improve efficiency, reduce 
 
 449. Email from Elizabeth A. Ising, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Office of 
Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 23, 2012) (on file 
with SEC at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/ 
provinceofstjoseph021012-14a8.pdf). 
 450. Letter from Michael J. Reedich, Special Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n, to Elizabeth A. Ising, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Feb. 10, 
2012) (on file with SEC at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-
8/2012/ provinceofstjoseph021012-14a8.pdf). 
 451. Letter from Gwendolen Noyes, to David Rosenthal, Corp. Sec’y, Exxon 
Mobil Corp. (Dec. 14, 2011) (see Encl. Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/sisters 
ofstdominic021012-14a8.pdf. 
 452. EXXONMOBIL, NOTICE OF 2012 ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 
71-72 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34088/ 
000119312512160085/ d277949ddef14a.htm#toc277949_23. 
94http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/4
  
234 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
emissions, and contribute to effective long-term solutions to 
manage climate risks.”453 
To summarize, it would in fact be difficult for the SEC to 
decide that study groups and quantitative goals are similar when 
Congress believes otherwise.  In terms of climate adaptation and 
mitigation, it is likely that socially responsible investing will grow 
in populism if company’s negotiations with investors fold.  
Companies therefore have an added incentive to respond.  The 
issues tabled illustrate not only the relevancy of a right to 
information but also the capacity and willingness of people to 
leverage a public concern through private international law.  
Indeed, if existing human rights architecture in public 
international law is found wanting in the era of climate change, 
and is not yet developed sufficiently to respond to the subjective 
test of equity, third generation rights, peoples’ rights or a jus 
gentium, then private international law may be a more 
responsive avenue for collective action and the enforcement of 
extraterritorial human rights.  Climate justice movements are yet 
to seize this opportunity. 
b. Climate Disclosure Obligations in the U.K. 
Turning to the U.K. case study, not only did party manifestos 
commit to rigid targets and a low-carbon economy, but 
Parliament did as well.  Rigorous emissions reduction mitigation 
targets and a framework for adaptation were made law when the 
U.K. enacted the Climate Change Act by Royal Assent on 
November 26, 2008 (CCA 2008).454  The CCA 2008 establishes the 
framework for the U.K.’s low carbon economy.  It sets legally 
binding GHG emission reduction targets,455 provides impetus for 
climate change adaptation,456 establishes an institutional 
structure, including the establishment of a body corporate to be 
known as the Committee on Climate Change,457 confers powers to 
 
 453. Id. 
 454. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27. 
 455. Id. pt. 1. 
 456. Id. pt. 4. 
 457. Id. pt. 2. 
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create and regulate trading schemes,458 and provides financial 
incentives to reduce domestic waste and improve recycling and 
other connected purposes.459 
In terms of carbon target and budgeting, the CCA 2008 
establishes a duty on the Secretary of State “to ensure that the 
net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is as least 80% lower 
than the 1990 baseline.”460  “[F]or the budgetary period including 
the year 2020,” the U.K. commits to reductions in the net carbon 
account (the carbon budget) of “at least 26% lower than the 1990 
baseline.”461  (The “1990 baseline” is the aggregate amount of net 
U.K. carbon dioxide emissions in 1990, and net U.K. emissions for 
other targeted greenhouse gases for their respective base 
years).462  Other targeted GHG include methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydroflourocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride, and 
any “other greenhouse gas designated as a targeted greenhouse 
gas by order made by the Secretary of State.”463  Under strict 
conditions, such as changes in scientific knowledge or changes in 
international or EU law, a government order and affirmative 
Parliamentary procedure may amend both the baseline and the 
target.464  U.K. reduction targets therefore govern a robust legal 
duty albeit subject to amendment under rigorous conditions. 
Carbon budgets govern the attainment of the targets.465  The 
first three carbon budgets, which cap emissions over five-year 
periods, were set in law following the 2009 Budget.466  The U.K. 
committed to cut the U.K.’s greenhouse gas emissions, compared 
to 1990 levels, by twenty-two percent in the current period [2008-
2012], twenty-eight percent in the period centered on 2015 [2013-
2017], and thirty-four percent in the period centered on 2020 
[2018-2022].467  While the U.K.’s legally binding target sets 
 
 458. Id. pt. 3. 
 459. Id. 
 460. Id. pt. 1, § 1(1). 
 461. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 1, § 5(1)(a). 
 462. Id. pt. 1, § 1(2). 
 463. Id. pt. 1, § 24(1). 
 464. Id. pt. 1, § 2. 
 465. Id. pt. 1, § 4. 
 466. Id. 
 467. HM GOV’T, THE UK LOW CARBON TRANSITION PLAN: NATIONAL STRATEGY 
FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY 36 (2009). 
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emissions reduction targets to be at least twenty-six percent 
lower than the 1990 baseline in 2020,468 the key interim target is 
for a thirty-four percent reduction by 2020.469 
In terms of reporting, the Government must prepare and 
report to Parliament on policies and proposals to meet the 
established carbon budgets pursuant to sections 13 and 14 of the 
CCA 2008.470  The Committee on Climate Change established 
pursuant to Part 2, section 32(1) of the Climate Change Act, also 
has broad responsibilities for reporting and information 
dissemination.471  The Committee’s proactive (anticipatory) 
obligations include submitting annual reports to Parliament on 
the U.K.’s progress towards the targets and budgets,472 providing 
advice in connection with carbon budgets,473 and engaging in 
consultation with national authorities.474  The Committee also 
has ancillary anticipatory powers, such as to conduct and publish 
research and analysis.475  In terms of reactive obligations to 
respond to information requests, the Committee is to report on 
carbon targets and budgeting.476 
At a sectoral level, the Committee on Climate Change, 
established as an independent body under the CCA 2008, is to 
advise government as to whether international aviation and 
shipping emissions should fall under the ambit of the Act or 
explain to Parliament why not by December 31, 2012.477  If the 
government excludes aviation and shipping then other sectors 
will have to compensate accordingly.  It is hard to imagine that 
other sectors could compensate for the entire shortfall.  This 
position was taken into consideration in April 2012 when the 
CCC advised Government to include international aviation and 
shipping.  A decision has to be made by the end of the year.  
 
 468. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 1, § 5(1)(a). 
 469. HM GOV’T, supra note 467, at 36. 
 470. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 1, §§ 13, 14. 
 471. Id. pt. 2, § 32(1). 
 472. Id. pt. 2 § 36(1). 
 473. Id. pt. 2 § 34(1). 
 474. Id. pt. 2 § 33(4). 
 475. Id. pt. 2 § 39(3). 
 476. Id. pt. 2 § 36. 
 477. Id. pt. 1 § 30(3). 
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Publication of a Sustainable Framework for U.K. Aviation is also 
relevant in this context.478  According to the Secretary of State for 
Transport, the framework could be adopted by March 2013.479 
The U.K. government published a response to the 2009 
Aviation Report on August 25, 2011.  Pursuant to the CCA 2008 
(Section 30),480 the U.K. Government is revising its regulations 
implementing aviation EU Emissions Trading System (ETS),481 
to ensure all aircraft operators that meet the criteria for 
regulation by the U.K. can come under the umbrella of U.K. 
regulators.  The challenge is that U.K. law no longer resides in 
isolation from EU law or international law.  Controversies arise 
at the nexus of other regimes, climate and trade law being a 
prime example. 
At a European level, the “Aviation directive” (2008/101/EC), 
was due for transposition into national legislation by February 
2010.482  Collection of annual emissions data for aircraft 
operators also began in 2010.  Aircraft operators covered by the 
EU’s ETS were to apply to their “competent authority” (regulator) 
for a share of free CO2 allowances available from the 2010 
benchmarking process by March 31, 2011.483  Each aircraft 
operator is to submit allowances to the “competent authority” to 
 
 478. DEP’T FOR TRANSP., GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT ON REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS FROM UK AVIATION TO 
2050 1 (2011). 
 479. Dep’t for Transp., Written Statement: Developing a Sustainable 
Framework for UK Aviation: Scoping Document, GOV.UK (Mar. 29, 2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/developing-a-sustainable-framework-
for-uk-aviation-scoping-focument; DEP’T FOR TRANSP., DEVELOPING A 
SUSTAINABLE FRAMEWORK FOR UK AVIATION: SCOPING DOCUMENT, SUMMARY OF 
RESPONSES (2012). 
 480. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c.27, pt. 1, § 30. 
 481. Directive 2003/87, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
October 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 1 (EC) (amending Directive of the European 
Parliament and Council 96/61/EC(5), as amended by Directive 2004/101/EC); 
Directive 2009/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009, 2009 O.J. (L 140/63) (EC) (amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of 
the Community). 
 482. Directive 2008/101/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
19 November 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 8/3) (amending Directive 2003/87/EC to include 
aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Community). 
 483. Id. 
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cover annual emissions by April of the following year.484  Similar 
requirements exist for other emitters covered by the EU’s ETS.  
In terms of shipping, on November 3, 2011, a CCC review 
recommended that the U.K.’s share of international shipping, 
which could account for up to eleven percent of total emissions 
permitted under the Climate Change Act by 2050, be included in 
the 2050 target.485 
The CCC’s 2012 progress report is consistent with these 
earlier opinions but it is yet to consider the extraterritorial effect 
of such decisions.  Trying to regulate international operations, 
such as aviation and shipping, is certain to attract mounting 
criticism of discrimination and breach of sovereignty if such laws 
try to extend outside of their territorial jurisdiction or apply 
domestic measures with extraterritorial implications.486  (The 
Article will highlight some of these complications concerning the 
law of the global commons after providing some further 
background). 
Returning to the U.K., the CCC concluded in April 2012 that 
there is no longer any reason to account for international aviation 
and shipping emissions differently to those from other sectors 
(e.g. power, buildings, and surface transport).  To do so, would 
create uncertainty.  According to the CCC, 
[t]here are no additional costs associated with inclusion of 
international aviation and shipping, given that these reflect 
commitments that have already been made (i.e. to currently 
legislated budgets, to inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS, and to 
the IMO’s policy for reducing shipping emissions). The overall 
costs associated with meeting a 2050 target that includes 
international aviation and shipping emissions, of the order of 1-
 
 484. Id. 
 485. CCC Review Suggests that the UK’s Share of International Shipping 
Emissions Should be Included in Climate Targets, COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.theccc.org.uk/news/press-releases/1104-ccc-review-
suggests-that-the-uks-share-of-international-shipping-emissions-should-be-
included-in-climate-targets-3-nov-20. 
 486. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & 
Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R., available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document 
/document.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=DOC&docid=1
17193&occ=first&dir=&cid=306423 
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2% of 2050 GDP, were accepted at the time the Climate Change 
Act was legislated.487 
Yet, at the same time, there is a great deal of controversy.  
The EU’s measures, and those of the U.K., must be WTO 
compliant.  If not, they could potentially be open to challenge in 
the WTO (perhaps as a claim of discriminatory treatment under 
the GATT or in consideration of a potential GATS claim).  In 
defense, there may be justification for an inconsistent measure by 
relying on an Article XX GATT exception or even by invoking 
international law and the novel idea of an Article XI security 
exception now that the U.N. has linked climate change to a 
potential global security crisis.  An international boycott could 
also put an end to the scheme in its intended format. 
In the U.S. a bill (H.R. 2594), entitled “European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011,” intends to 
prohibit U.S operators of civil aircraft from participating in the 
European Union’s emissions trading scheme, and it has other 
purposes.  The bill was received in the Senate October 31, 2011 
and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation December 17, 2011.488  Senator John Thune’s bill, 
also entitled “European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
Prohibition Act of 2011,” was introduced in the Senate July 12, 
2011.  It found more success.  It was presented to the President 
November 16, 2012, signed November 27, 2012, and became 
public law No: 112-200.489  According to The Economist, reports of 
February 6, 2012, indicated that China had provisionally barred 
its airlines from participating in the EU’s ETS scheme.490  Then 
at the end of the year, on November 12, 2012, Connie Hedegaard, 
the European Commissioner for Climate Action, “announced that 
 
 487. UK COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MEETING CARBON BUDGETS – 2012 
PROGRESS REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 77 (June 2012), available at 
http://hmccc.s3.amazonaws.com/2012%20Progress/CCC_Progress%20Rep%2020
12_bookmarked_singles_1.pdf. 
 488. European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 
2594, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 489. European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 112-200, 126 Stat. 1477 (2011). 
 490. J.A., China and Europe's Emission-Trading Scheme, Not free to fly, 
ECONOMIST (February 8, 2012, 06:55 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs 
/schumpeter/2012/02/china-and-europes-emission-trading-scheme. 
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the European Union would defer the requirement under the EU 
Emissions Trading System for airlines to surrender allowances 
for flights into and out of Europe.”491 
These controversies illustrate yet again that governance of 
international climate law urges the need for a new legal 
architecture to regulate the global commons.  The Kyoto Protocol 
provides some guidance but it is a plurilateral agreement that 
does not include all parties.492  The UNFCCC framework is a 
universal framework and could perhaps serve as a better lever to 
find a multilateral solution in accord with common but 
differentiated responsibilities and by working with the 
International Civil Aviation Organization and the International 
Maritime Organization, respectively.  Decisions of the UNFCCC 
COP 17 meeting in Durban support this direction.  Under 
“Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in 
order to enhance the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c), 
of the Convention,” the “Parties agreed to continue [their] 
consideration of issues related to addressing emissions from 
international aviation and maritime transport.”493 
Finding appropriate solutions to these polemics will impinge 
on the implementation of the U.K’s climate change legislation 
and implementing instruments.  The U.K’s CCA 2008 also 
provides for trading schemes and sets out the scope for devolved 
authorities to create two types of trading regulations.494  Cap-
and-trade schemes limit activities that consist of, cause, or 
 
 491. Connie Hedegaard: “EU Willing to 'Stop the Clock' on Aviation in the EU 
ETS for Flights Into and Out of Europe Until After the ICAO General Assembly 
Next Autumn,” EUR. COMM’N NEWS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/news/2012-11-12_01_en.htm. 
 492. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 252, art. 10(2)2 (“The Parties included in 
Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, 
working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the 
International Maritime Organization, respectively.”). 
 493. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Durban, 
South Africa, Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Seventeenth Session, Decision 2/CP.17 Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, para. 78, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1. 
 494. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 3, § 44. 
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contribute to GHG emissions.495  Incentive schemes aim to reduce 
or remove GHG emissions and any cause thereof or contribution 
thereto.496  Schedule 2 to the CCA 2008 sets out information that 
must be incorporated within the regulations.497 
Part 4 of the CCA 2008 pertains to adaptation.  It includes 
comprehensive reporting and information obligations.  The 
Secretary of State is to lay climate change risk assessment 
reports before Parliament at least once every five years and a 
program setting out how the Government will respond to those 
risks. 
Sections 83, 84, and 85 of the CCA 2008 provide very specific 
provisions about company reporting and an action plan for 
government.498  Section 83 of the Climate Change Act mandated 
the U.K. government to provide guidance on GHG emission 
reporting by October 1, 2009.499  The U.K.’s Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), in partnership 
with the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 
published guidance for U.K. organizations in September 2009.500  
The report sets out guidelines on measuring GHG emissions and 
setting targets by which to reduce GHG emissions.501  In the 
spirit of multi-nodal governance, a small business user guide was 
also produced.502  The U.K.’s reporting guidance is based on 
World Resources Institute and World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development’s standard entitled the “GHG Protocol’s 
Corporate Standard,” which provides guidance for organization 
on preparing inventories of GHG emissions and targets for their 
reduction.503 
 
 495. See id. 
 496. See id. 
 497. Id. pt. 3 § 46. 
 498. See id. 
 499. Id. pt. 5 § 83. 
 500. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, GUIDANCE ON HOW TO 
MEASURE AND REPORT YOUR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2009). 
 501. Id. 
 502. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, SMALL BUSINESS USER 
GUIDE: GUIDANCE ON HOW TO MEASURE AND REPORT YOUR GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS (2009). 
 503. Corporate Standard, GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, http://www.ghgprotocol 
.org/standards/corporate-standard (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
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Pursuant to Section 84 of the Climate Change Act 2008, the 
U.K.’s Secretary of State was tasked with laying a report on the 
“contribution of reporting to climate change objectives” to the 
U.K. Parliament before December 1, 2010.504  In accord with its 
obligations, DEFRA published the report in November 2010.505  
The report includes an assessment on disclosure duties and 
assesses how investors use climate change information but it does 
not go as far to recommend mandatory disclosure.506 
Other issues arise when considering whether company 
disclosure should be voluntary or mandatory.  In 2010, a U.K. 
report on “the contribution that reporting of greenhouse gas 
emissions makes to the UK meeting its climate change objectives: 
a review of the current evidence” found that “62% of FTSE all-
share companies reported quantified figures on climate change or 
energy use in their 2009 annual reports and 22% are disclosing 
absolute figures on their total GHG emissions, showing improved 
performance since 2004.”507  Thus akin to the U.S., market 
dynamics and investor demands seem to be pushing for greater 
transparency in any event.  These sentiments are reflected in 
section 85 of the CCA 2008. 
Section 85 (1) of the CCA 2008 obliged the Secretary of State, 
by no later than April 6, 2012, to: 
(a) make regulations under section 416(4) of the Companies Act 
2006 (c. 46) requiring the directors’ report of a company to 
contain such information as may be specified in the regulations 
about emissions of greenhouse gases from activities for which the 
company is responsible, or 
(b) lay before Parliament a report explaining why no such 
regulations have been made . . . .508 
 
 504. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 5, § 84. 
 505. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, THE CONTRIBUTION THAT 
REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS MAKES TO THE UK MEETING ITS 
CLIMATE CHANGE OBJECTIVES: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT EVIDENCE (2010) 
[hereinafter A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT EVIDENCE], available at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/business/reporting/pdf/corporate-
reporting101130.pdf. 
 506. Id. 
 507. A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT EVIDENCE, supra note 505, at 7. 
 508. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 5, § 85. 
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DEFRA launched a public consultation on the “Further 
Promotion of Consistent Corporate Reporting of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions” on May 11, 2011, and invited views by July 5, 2011, 
on how to promote widespread and consistent reporting by U.K. 
companies.509  An impact assessment was made publically 
available on May 20, 2011.510  Besides business as usual with no 
policy change, the assessment identified four specific options: 
enhanced voluntary reporting (option 1), mandatory GHG 
reporting under the Companies Act for all quoted companies 
(option 2), mandatory GHG reporting under the Companies Act 
for all large companies (option 3), and mandatory GHG reporting 
for all companies meeting an energy use criteria (option 4).511  
DEFRA published a summary of the consultation responses in 
June 2012.512  The Article presents an overview of the main 
findings below. 
In general, participants responding to the consultation 
consider that option 1, enhanced voluntary reporting, will not 
level the playing field or improve consistency in reporting. 513  
Besides, many voluntary schemes are already available.  As to 
option 2, mandatory reporting for quoted companies, there is a 
general view that quoted companies should be held to account but 
the disadvantages include missing large private companies, the 
number is too few and it targets those who are already likely to 
report.514  Option 3, mandatory reporting for large companies, 
was clearly a favorite although the majority of trade associations 
and professional bodies and a sizeable minority of companies 
supported voluntary reporting rather than regulation.515  An 
 
 509. Letter from Alice Douglas, Dep’t for Env’t Food & Rural Affairs, to 
Consultee (May 11, 2011) (on file with author), available at 
www.defra.gov.uk/consult/files/110511-ghg-emissions-letter1.pdf. 
 510. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF 
OPTIONS FOR COMPANY GHG REPORTING (2011), available at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/consult/files/110511-ghg-emissions-ia1.pdf. 
 511. Id. at 1. 
 512. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, MEASURING AND REPORTING 
OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS BY UK COMPANIES, SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION 
RESPONSES (2012), available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/consult/files/20120620-
ghg-consult-sumresp.pdf. 
 513. Id. at 5. 
 514. Id. at 5-6. 
 515. Id. at 6. 
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added advantage of company reporting was to facilitate 
companies to monitor and manage supply chain emissions.516  
There would therefore be a trickle-down effect to smaller 
companies.  Disadvantages include disproportionate 
administrative costs and a heavy burden on new reporters.  
Option 4’s focus on energy intensive businesses is material but 
these companies are likely to be reporting already.517  Option 4 is 
also complex.  It is not consistent with the Companies Act and 
participants responding to the consultation believed that 
numerous exclusions and derogations could potentially weaken 
reporting anyhow.518  Besides these four options, participant’s 
put forward other suggestions for improvement, including more 
targeted reporting, sectoral commitments, a phasing in, 
leveraging the assistance of NGO’s, and building on best 
practices.519 
Following the public consultation, the Government has agreed 
with the majority of respondents to introduce regulation to 
require some companies to report their GHG emissions in the 
directors’ report of their annual report. The Government is 
committed to reducing the regulatory burden on companies and 
so has decided to introduce Option 2 (regulation for all quoted 
companies) which has the lowest regulatory cost of the regulatory 
options. Experience of this introduction will be used to update the 
cost and benefit information contained in the final impact 
assessment. In 2016, the Government will take a decision, based 
on this updated information, whether to extend the requirement 
to all large companies.520 
More targeted reporting is sensible.  Going forward, the 
government will need to ensure that information is relevant.  
Attention is required to structure the modalities by which to 
discipline climate change information.  Accountability, integrity, 
timeliness, and transparency determine, inter alia, the subjective 
 
 516. Id. 
 517. Id. 
 518. Id. 
 519. Id. at 7. 
 520. Id. at 22. 
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test of a right to information and ought to support the objectivity 
of relevant information. 
National directions also need to reflect emerging 
international and regional guidelines for monitoring, reporting, 
and verification (MRV).  (Some of these were referred to earlier 
under the respective treaty framework of the UNFCCC and the 
plurilateral Kyoto Protocol).  “PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 
ERM, and the Institute of Environmental Management and 
Assessment (IEMA) concur with the prevailing international view 
that emission reporting demonstrates the current business 
situation, enables target setting and progress tracking and is 
therefore central to the commitment of the company to action.”521 
Current reporting structures, however, are often unwieldy, 
fragmented, and leave little room for investors (or government) to 
make useful comparisons.  In part, this is due to the absence of a 
common accounting regime, which is an objective criterion.  
However, there are also divergences concerning the effectiveness 
of any substantive agreement. 
While promoting voluntary reporting may be a good way 
forward, at least in terms of the numbers issued by the SEC in 
the U.S. and DEFRA in the U.K., there is still the issue of how to 
make the best use of the data to reinforce proactive (anticipatory) 
obligations and reactive (responsive) obligations governing the 
right to information.  Comparisons may not be meaningful 
without some degree of conformity to reporting guidelines.  An 
enhanced “template-based” reporting mechanism could be 
developed online; but without employing appropriate qualitative 
techniques, a lot of important yet more subjective information 
that influences decisions will simply be foregone.  Developing 
completely different guidelines at national levels may not be that 
helpful anyhow.  Climate harm crosses borders. 
The U.S. approach to climate change disclosure provides 
some solutions that could carry through internationally.  
Voluntary company disclosure in the U.S. leads to the provision of 
far more extensive information, but voluntary disclosure is in no 
way a substitute for a cohesive de jure governing framework of 
conformity and compliance regulation.  Such pitfalls of failing to 
 
 521. Id. 
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collate and compare relevant information have already been 
observed at the international level where a mishmash of 
reporting structures have resulted in procedural and 
implementation difficulties.  Moreover, information needs not 
only to be relevant, it needs to be disciplined for effect.  An 
examination of the modalities that discipline information is far 
more likely to give direction to effective regulatory options.  As 
identified above, these issues are equally identified within the 
U.K. and require further consideration as the U.K. turns to 
implement option 2 (mandatory reporting for quoted companies). 
There are still other issues for the U.K. government to 
consider before 2016.  Turning to an extension of the proposed 
mandatory regulatory options, any such reporting for 
incorporated companies would still fall under the ambit of 
regulations under Section 416(4) of the Companies Act 2006.522  
These regulations would thereby apply to U.K. incorporated 
companies required to prepare a director’s report as part of their 
annual reporting obligations.523 
For many small businesses, the cost of even more weighty 
reporting could prove unsustainable.  Larger businesses 
contribute more to GHG emissions.  They should therefore 
contribute more to the adverse effects of climate change.  Even for 
listed companies it is uncertain as to what degree their 
contributions to the U.K. economy ought to be offset by their 
contributions to planetary environmental harm.  What sort of tax 
breaks, if any, should be set in place to support heavier reporting 
burdens?  What types of other support mechanisms will be 
considered?  What will be the design of these mechanisms so as 
not to impose an unfair restriction on trade?  These are tough but 
important questions. 
Regulating the right to information and the duty to disclose 
does not reside in isolation from other bodies of international law.  
To be prepared for such eventualities, companies should seek to 
understand their respective business plans behind the 
reinforcement of the right to information.  Government also needs 
to comprehend the extraterritorial effects of its decisions. 
 
 522. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 416(4) (U.K.). 
 523. See id. 
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Participants responding to the U.K.’s government 
consultation also identified with questions of equity and fairness 
in the sense of common but differentiated responsibilities.  
Differentiating the scale of obligations owed by unlisted 
companies vis-a-vis quoted companies does not mean that 
loopholes should exist ad infinitum.  Establishing stricter 
disclosure requirements for quoted companies and voluntary 
reporting for unlisted companies is a move in the right direction.  
Notwithstanding, this option still lets large private companies 
and significant trusts slip through the loop.  Larger companies 
and trust holdings are likely to contribute more to climate change 
than small enterprises and many will already have solid investor 
relations teams in place. 
Distinguishing between reactive and proactive reporting 
obligations for larger companies may be helpful.  However, as 
aforementioned, reporting obligations should not restrict trade or 
competition.  A high degree of rigorous regulations could emerge 
as reinforcing non-tariff barriers to trade and keep the U.K. 
economy in abeyance.  Any attempt to impose regulations on 
other countries is likely to do the same.  Imposing stricter 
regulations on companies that consume more energy may evolve 
as a form of productivity capping that impedes local competition 
and simply encourages companies to go offshore and take all the 
economic benefits of steady jobs, local livelihoods, and 
government income with them. 
Supply chains are global so local decisions should not exist in 
isolation from the broader context within which national law 
resides.  It is likely that U.K. reporting will have to align far more 
with EU and international developments in meeting objective and 
subjective tests of equity at some stage.  Some U.K. companies 
already report on their GHG emissions, either voluntarily or due 
to obligations under the EU’s ETS, the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment (CRC) Energy Efficiency Scheme, and other climate 
change agreements, which are discussed below. 
As aforementioned, the ETS is a central component of the 
U.K’s policy for delivering emissions reductions in the U.K. and 
across the EU.  The EU’s ETS Directive (Directive 2003/87/EC, as 
amended by Directive 2009/29/EC, which had a deadline for 
transposition by Member States by December 31, 2012) governs 
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the EU’s cap-and-trade scheme.524  Directive 2003/87/EC, 
introduced in 2005 by the U.K’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading Scheme 2005,525 provides for access to information 
subject to Directive 2003/4/EC.  It sets a “cap” on the total 
amount of certain greenhouse gases that factories, power plants, 
and other installations in the system can emit.  In addition, 
provisions for MRV are mandated to European Member States for 
certain specified activities holding GHG emissions permits.  
Commission Decision 2007/589/EC of July 18, 2007, establishes 
guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas 
emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council.526  The Monitoring and Reporting 
Guidelines (MRG) are to be used for the 2008-2012 phase.  New 
Regulations concerning EU ETS monitoring, reporting, 
verification and authentication will apply to emissions from 
January 1, 2013.  In accordance with the revised ETS Directive 
(2009/29/EC), phase III of the EU Emissions Trading System will 
be from 2013-2020.527 
In 2009, Commission Decision 2009/339/EC of April 16, 2009, 
amended Decision 2007/589/EC as regards to the inclusion of 
monitoring and reporting guidelines for emissions and ton-
kilometer data from aviation activities.528  Aviation activities 
were included in the scheme by virtue of Directive 
 
 524. Directive 2003/87, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
October 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 1 (EC) (amending Directive of the European 
Parliament and Council 96/61/EC(5), as amended by Directive 2004/101/EC);   
Directive 2009/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009, 2009 O.J. (L 140/63) (EC) (amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of 
the Community). 
 525. The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Regulations, 2005, S.I. 
2005/925 (U.K.). 
 526. See id. 
 527. Directive 2009/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
2009 O.J. (L 140/63) (EC), art. 11 (amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of 
the Community). 
 528. Directive 2009/339, of the European Parliament and Council, 2009 O.J. (L 
103) (EC). 
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2008/101/EC.529  In addition, the ETS scheme was further 
improved and extended by virtue of Directive 2009/29/EC.530 
A draft Commission Regulation on the approval of a 
simplified tool developed by the European organization for air 
safety navigation (Eurocontrol) to estimate the fuel consumption 
of certain small emitting aircraft operators is also under 
negotiation.531  The draft version was approved by the Climate 
Change Committee on February 17, 2010, and was sent to the 
European Parliament for scrutiny.532  The U.K. could also 
consider reinforcing the alignment of measurement, reporting 
and verification of GHG emissions by U.K. companies by 
industrial sector. 
The U.K.’s Carbon Reduction Commitment (recently 
renamed the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme) is an energy saving 
and carbon emissions reduction scheme that requires mandatory 
reporting of emissions for all organizations using more than 6,000 
MWh per year of electricity (equivalent to an annual electricity 
bill of about £500,000) not covered by the EU ETS or certain 
other Climate Change Agreements.533  The CRC Energy 
Efficiency Scheme Order 2010 came into force on March 22, 
2010.534  The Scheme started on April 1, 2010.  With the view to 
simplify the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme, DECC undertook a 
consultation between March 27, 2012 and June 18, 2012.  The 
results showed broad support for a simplification package and in 
response the Government intends to make an order to come into 
force on June 1, 2013 with the second phase starting in April 
 
 529. Directive 2008/101, of the European Parliament and Council, 2008 O.J. (L 
8) (EC); see also Decision 2009/450/EC, of the European Parliament and Council 
of 8 June 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 149) 69 (explaining the interpretation of the 
aviation activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC).  
 530. Directive 2009/29, of the European Parliament and Council, 2009 O.J. (L 
140) (EC). 
 531. EUROPEAN COMM’N, DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION ON THE APPROVAL OF A 
SIMPLIFIED TOOL DEVELOPED BY THE EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR AIR SAFETY 
NAVIGATION (EUROCONTROL) TO ESTIMATE THE FUEL CONSUMPTION OF CERTAIN 
SMALL EMITTING AIRCRAFT OPERATORS 1 (2009), available at http://www.lne.be/en 
/ets-aviation/overview-legislation/100217small-emitter-regulation-post-isc-4.pdf. 
 532. Id. 
 533. Carbon Reduction Commitment, CRC MAGAZINE (Oct. 20, 2010), http://w 
ww.carbonreductioncommitment.info/. 
 534. CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order, S.I. 2010/768 (U.K.). 
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2014.535  The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne made 
an announcement to this effect to the House of Commons in his 
autumn statement of December 5, 2012 concerning carbon taxes.  
He said, “[T]he Government will simplify the CRC energy 
efficiency scheme from 2013.”536  The Government will review the 
effectiveness of the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme in 2016.537 
The climate change levy (CCL), introduced as Climate 
Change Levy Agreements and a type of pricing mechanism under 
the 2000 Finance Act in 2001, could also perhaps be reviewed at 
this time.538  The CCL is a type of levy that targets energy-
intensive industries and specified energy products (taxable 
commodities) permitting up to a 65% discount (90% on electricity 
from April 2013) provided the companies meet targets to improve 
energy efficiency or reduce their carbon emissions.539  Following 
another consultation in 2012, a new Climate Change Agreement 
(CCA) scheme will start in April 2013 (the current scheme expires 
in March 2013). 
There are some issues to be worked through.  In 2008 the 
House of Commons reported that, 
The CCL has not worked quite as expected.  According to 
economic theory, businesses should have acted rationally by 
seeking to reduce their costs through increased energy efficiency.  
In practice, they appear to have needed an extra stimulus to 
change their approach to energy use.  This has profound 
implications for climate change policy more widely.  If even large 
companies require additional policies to drive behavioural 
change, this must be all the more true for small businesses, 
 
 535. U.K. DEP’T OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO 
THE CONSULTATION ON SIMPLIFYING THE CRC ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCHEME 13 
(2012). 
 536. HM TREASURY, AUTUMN STATEMENT 70 (2012). 
 537. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION ON SIMPLIFYING THE CRC 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCHEME, supra note 535, at 14; HM TREASURY, AUTUMN 
STATEMENT 70 (2012). 
 538. Malcolm Hill et. al., Impacts of Climate Change Agreements on British 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 22 ENERGY & ENV’T 343 (2011). 
 539. Climate Change Agreements: Policy and Legislation, DEP’T OF ENERGY & 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/emissions/ ccas/ccas_ 
policy/ccas_policy.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2012); Climate Change Levy, HM 
REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/climate-change-levy/index.htm 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2012). 
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public bodies, and private households.  The Government should 
report on how it is applying this lesson the across the whole of 
the UK Climate Change Programme.540 
The implications are equally relevant at the international level 
considering the challenges in developing subjective or behavioral 
tests to fulfill objective guarantees. 
At some stage, it would be useful to undertake a 
comprehensive review of all the U.K.’s reporting instruments.  
2016 may be a good year.  2016 was mentioned above concerning 
a decision on extending Consistent Corporate Reporting of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions.  Other reporting requirements could 
be brought into the 2016 review. Given parallel discussions 
taking place in the EU and internationally, and the complexity of 
the overall reporting regime, government may consider keeping 
the voluntary regime but support it by firming up the reporting 
structures so that it can make useful comparisons.  Appropriate 
business incentives could also enhance reporting. Regulating 
disclosure obligations through bilateral negotiations and 
voluntary agreements on a company-by-company basis in line 
with predetermined regulatory guidelines could also supplement 
this overall package.  While this latter option may appear 
expensive, the higher upfront costs should be balanced by lower 
back end costs.  The analysis may be far more robust and useful, 
and duplications and misinterpretations, which are inevitable 
with yes or no quantitative scales, may be avoided. 
To summarize, companies are already overburdened with 
reporting requirements, so any reporting system should aim to 
find a balance between facilitating companies to pursue their 
profit agendas and their obligations to present and future 
generations.  The right to information is a fundamental human 
right that invokes a reactive obligation to respond and a proactive 
obligation to collect and disseminate information.  The evolution 
of the duty to disclose reinforces these legal obligations and raises 
serious issues for private sector enterprises.  Not only could 
liability arise due to fraudulent representation but also due to the 
failure to disclose climate information or even inadequate 
 
 540. HOUSE OF COMMONS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT 
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disclosure thereof.  Similar to the U.S., the U.K. leverages 
corporate action through broad consultation processes that 
engage a plurality of stakeholders, media awareness, investor 
pressure, sectoral regulation, corporate and finance laws, and 
multi-level governance.  Both rely on a global framework and a 
universal approach to the right to information. 
If U.K. regulation evolves in isolation from the supporting 
framework of regional and international law it is likely to 
fragment the right to information even more and merely place a 
higher burden on U.K. companies.  Any decision made in the U.K. 
may therefore benefit by considering streamlining the U.K.’s 
entire reporting ambit (locally, regionally, and globally).  A 
common international accounting regime is required but this will 
not have good effect if local regimes are fragmented.  Helping 
higher users to analyze their inputs and outputs and find 
alternative and more efficient energy solutions should link to the 
overall package of reinforcing effectiveness at the local level.  A 
far more cohesive right to know and duty to disclose could 
consider harmonizing new instruments to regulate quoted 
companies with those requirements already set out under 
existing instruments, including the EU’s ETS, the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment (CRC), and other Climate Change 
Agreements. 
III. A PATHWAY TO PROVIDENCE 
To conclude, this Article has demonstrated how general 
international public law, human rights law, and environmental 
law inform the right to information about the adverse effects of 
climate change.  Whether at the national or international level, 
the right to climate change information hinges on guaranteeing 
and enforcing both proactive and reactive obligations.  In 
advancing climate law and the right to information, actors need 
to align their respective obligations (locally, regionally, and 
within the context of the constitutionalism of international 
climate law).  Drawing on the willingness and capacity of all 
parties to negotiate and reach consensus on extraterritorial 
agreements will serve as an impetus for this alignment. 
The findings show that the right to know and the duty to 
disclose rely not only on the relevancy of information, but also on 
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how the law disciplines that information.  Accountability, 
integrity, timeliness, and transparency embellish “what 
information is - or is not - taken to be directly relevant” and 
strengthen a theory of justice by the employ of both objective and 
subjective tests of equity. 
Balancing contradictions between the relevancy of 
information and the disciplines governing the right to 
information remain at the heart of many controversies.  States 
and non-state actors, individuals, communities, and businesses 
are often unable to exercise their right to effective justice unless 
they have an objective understanding of the relevant information 
within the context of a disciplined universal framework.  In turn, 
the quality of the right to information will inform actor’s means to 
participate in decision-making processes and access effective 
remedies.  Likewise, such actions need to be put into a unified 
and universal context. 
The UNFCCC is a binding universal treaty that establishes 
the legal architecture by which to underpin rules, and other 
norms, that will, inter alia, regulate GHG emissions and facilitate 
agreed outcomes that have legal force.  Deep uncertainty means 
that the informational inputs that support such a system can 
never be completely reliable.  They are forever changing.  Leaving 
aside the scientific debate and perpetually changing imperfect 
information about future costs and benefits, there is still a need 
to give effect to a robust system for monitoring, reporting, and 
verification that resides within a universal constitutionalism of 
international climate law.  All countries, not just the developing, 
require accountability, integrity, and temporality of comparative 
accounting rules and effective processes. 
Upholding the integrity of the UNFCCC is far more 
dependent on reaching consensus on universally agreed 
normative processes within the constitutionalism of international 
climate law than introducing more ad hoc institutional 
restructuring arrangements or deep structural adjustments.  The 
later sometimes even serve as engines of destabilization and 
fragmentation and they do little to build a systematically 
coherent architecture of human rights for the global commons.  
As disputes about reporting aviation emissions show, the former 
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depends on reaching a unified normative accord, a jus gentium, at 
the global level before being able to implement it nationally. 
Going forward, climate law negotiators could make 
significant strides in advancing the right to information by 
finding a better balance between substance and form and 
between the relevancy and disciplines of the right to know and 
the duty to disclose.  Governments and non-governmental 
organizations could help facilitate the process of universal 
constitutionalism by making clear statements in this regard, 
perhaps at the next UNFCCC COP to be held in Warsaw, Poland, 
at the end of 2013, if not before.  Consolidating a framework for 
the right to climate information could be a helpful step forward; 
but, to do so, there needs to be a breath of fresh air and the 
“willingness and capacity” to discipline information for climate 
justice.541 
 
 
 541. Calling of an Int’l Conf. on Freedom of Info., supra note 2, at 95. 
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